

Africa: A New Nationalism

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Coming Next Month...

RUSSIA AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY

November, 1961

The November issue of CURRENT HISTORY is devoted to a study of the U. S. S. R. at a time when Russian policy has become a crucial problem for the West. Can the West hope to meet the challenge of the U. S. S. R. in Laos? Latin America? Berlin? Seven contributors discuss Russian policies in the following articles:

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RUSSIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS by *Ross N. Berkes*, Director, School of International Relations, University of Southern California.

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What are the forces at work for revolutionary change in Africa? What hope is there that the African nations will choose the slower path of evolutionary change and development? The editors of CURRENT HISTORY have devoted this issue to a study of the growth of African nationalism and the pressure for complete independence. Our introductory article points out that nationalism in Africa has stimulated the modernization of "African tribal society." For many this "... means a break with ancient and restrictive traditions ... in favor of individuality, social mobility and greater equality."

Changing Africa in a Changing World

By HANS KOHN

Professor of History, City College of New York

THE LAST YEARS of the 1950's were characterized by a new phenomenon, the entrance of Africa as an active partner into world history. Of the great continents, Africa alone has been strangely passive and silent throughout the ages. This of course has not been true of North Africa. There, in Egypt, the seat of one of the oldest civilizations and imperial powers of mankind existed. There Christianity and Islam quickly spread from western Asia and made lasting contributions to the intellectual life of the Mediterranean. But Africa south of the Sahara remained unknown until the age of explorations of the late fifteenth century. These explorations were confined to the coasts, where a few European settlements were established.

Inland Africa, however, was explored only in the middle of the nineteenth century. The "partition" of Africa among the colonial powers took place only in the 1880's. The passive integration of Africa south of the Sahara into the political organization of the known parts of the globe started not more

than 80 years ago. Therefore, in 1950, hardly anyone believed that this so recent passive integration would shortly end and that the African people would soon emerge as active political partners in history. They have done it under the flag of nationalism.

The process is not new. It happened in the middle of the nineteenth century in central Europe and in the beginning of the twentieth century in eastern Europe. It has happened in the middle of the twentieth century, with astonishing speed, in Asia. But though the end of the colonial empires in Asia and North Africa after World War II came as a surprise to many observers, it should not have amazed them.

The rise of nationalism in the Middle East, in Asia and the Far East has been unmistakably going on for decades. Its awakening in Egypt can be dated back at least to 1879, when the first popular military regime under Colonel Ahmed Arabi tried to overthrow the corrupt court aristocracy and to put an end to foreign interference. The Indian National Congress was established in

1885 and from that date an unbroken though changing line has led to Jawaharlal Nehru. The transformation of Japan into a modern nation began in the 1870's. In 1911 the Chinese revolution started its struggle against domestic corruption and autocracy and against foreign encroachments.

The triumphant self-assertion of nationalism in Asia and North Africa after the end of World War II could thus point to a preceding preparatory history of almost a century. Nothing was known of similar movements in Africa. The people of the Congo or Angola seemed even in 1950 submissively to accept their passive role. Yet by the beginning of the 1960's a new nationalism has started to assert itself clearly all over Africa.

Nationalism has been a modern phenomenon even among the peoples of central, eastern and southern Europe. It has come to Africa only very recently. Africa is the last continent to enter the age of nationalism and thereby the modern age. The manifestations of nationalism differ widely according to the historical circumstances of its rise, the cultural traditions and the social structure of the peoples involved.

Thus, in this age of nationalism a successful foreign policy demands an understanding of the assumptions underlying the various national attitudes, assumptions based upon the historical experiences and the cultural images of the various peoples. With all due differences, the state of mind which manifests itself in nationalism is similar everywhere, in Europe and in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. In the age of nationalism peoples wish no longer to be objects of a history made by others but wish to feel themselves active agents of their own history. They will accept no longer their traditional positions as unchangeable. They wish to improve their positions in their own lands and to improve the positions of their countries in relation to other countries.


Nationalism's Goals

This search for a new status demands an adjustment of existing social and psychological attitudes. Such an adjustment takes time and produces critical tensions. The peoples of Europe, Asia and Latin America have

often passed through long upheavals, bitter controversies and struggles before they became integrated nations. Seen in perspective, the transition from traditional to modern national society in Africa has been not only rapid but relatively smooth. The events which started in Africa in the 1950's represent the last stage in the world-wide revolutionary transformation of society. This transformation began in seventeenth and eighteenth century Northwest Europe and North America. It has spread with accelerating speed in the two centuries following until by now it has become world-wide. In this transformation which is fundamentally one and the same everywhere, the unity of mankind, long postulated by universal religions, by the Stoics, by the rational humanism of the age of Enlightenment, is for the first time becoming a reality.

The rise of nationalism and the quest for equality and human dignity, which now transform ancient and primitive tribal societies in sub-Saharan Africa, put the capstone to the growing edifice of humanity. Africa is a late comer to history. A century ago it formed the last great hunting ground for slaves. As far as we know today, it has participated less than any other major part of the globe in the higher manifestations of the mind, in philosophy, scholarship, great art. For this very reason the unexpected and sudden awakening of Africa arouses such a widespread interest and sympathy. It confirms that we are at the beginning of a new era of history, in which all formerly isolated and secluded parts of the globe are entering into communication and intercourse on a footing of legal equality.

The new world position of Africa was recently clearly visible at Strasbourg, France. There on June 20, 1961, the European Parliament, an organ of the new European Economic Community, met. When the Community was established only five years ago, the African peoples, then still being colonies of European nations, were automatically associated through their colonial masters with the Community. Meanwhile the 16 colonies in the Community have become independent nations, and as such they are represented in the European Parliament. A new economic association is to be worked out between the European Economic Com-



● Now the Republic of South Africa, as of May 31, 1961

Department of State Publication 7129, January, 1961

munity and the 16 African nations. Furthermore, in the Strasbourg meeting a German and a Senegalese alternated as presiding officers.

"The Africans are extremely sensitive on the matter of their independence," the *New York Times* reported on June 21, 1961.

They have decided that each nation will negotiate a separate bilateral association agreement, though presumably all will be similar. They want a voice in all decisions made and they want to avoid the slightest taint of economic dependence. As for the Europeans, those who spoke today bent over backward on the independence theme. Virtually all the Europeans clearly want

to see the association renewed, for the plain political purpose of helping retain this large section of Africa in a state of stability and in close ties with the West. But they insisted time after time that it would be a relationship among equals.

Not all Africans desire close economic contacts with Europe. Many are as jealous of the fullest economic independence as they are of their political independence. The trend to maintain former economic ties though transformed on the basis of equality conflicts with the new trend of pan-African cooperation. For at present Africans are not only entering for the first time into contact with the outside world as recognized partners, but also for the first time they are meeting each other. Until very recently distances, lack of communication, absence of a common language, had prevented their coming together. The people in Ghana knew little of the people in Angola, the people in the Congo or in Tanganyika little of the people of Morocco. No African consciousness as such existed. Now, and very rapidly, the Africans are overcoming this age-old separation.

Pan-Africanism

An African consciousness is growing. This common consciousness does not imply unification or unity, any more than it does in Europe or Latin America. From region to region, interests differ and conflict. Some African frontiers will be hotly disputed among African states; already now the relationships of Somalia and of Mauretania to their neighbors are uneasy, and there will be more cases, just as there have been and are bitter frontier disputes among European and among Latin American nations. Well established élites have their vested interests in state boundaries and power and do not wish to cede their place to competitors for pan-African or regional leadership. Efforts to federate have so far failed. But they failed equally among Scandinavian and Central American states, though these show an infinitely greater affinity among themselves than do the various African regions.

A pan-African unity or even regional unity is not to be expected in any foreseeable future. Nor might it be desirable. Problems, though fundamentally similar, differ never-

theless very much in the various parts of the continent south of the Sahara. Tribal traditions and customs, languages and religions show an amazing variety.

Only in the north, from Morocco to Egypt, do there exist past traditions of unity which possibly could point to closer cooperation in the future. There memories of a great common history and the powerful realities of a common language, culture and religion ease intercourse and support a feeling of belonging together. These elements are not confined to Arab-speaking Africa. They reach across the Sinai peninsula to the lands of the Fertile Crescent and the Arab peninsula. In this linguistic-cultural community Egypt occupies a central position by geography, population, history, economic wealth and cultural achievements. Egypt links Africa to Asia. And, for historical reasons which go back to Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, Egypt links Europe with the world that lies east of the Suez Canal.

Arabism and Islam are not confined to the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. They penetrate far into Africa, in the Sudan, in Somalia and Nigeria. Islamic propaganda, centered in the ancient traditional and in the large modern schools of Egypt, is making progress throughout middle Africa. Many of the North African states wish to maintain a policy of positive neutrality. Others, like Ghana, Guinea and Ethiopia, agree though they have close historical ties with the West and though most of their students and intellectuals have studied in the West.

Such a policy of neutrality was probably best defined by the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, a British colony soon to attain full independence. Prime Minister Julius Nyerere, known as a moderate, declared on June 1, 1961, in the National Assembly:

It would be wrong to describe independent Tanganyika's policy as that of neutralism, for the word neutral often carries a connotation of not caring. We do care, passionately, about the development of justice, of well being, and of peace throughout the world. We do care about the rights of man, about the independence and self-determination of nations or groups of nations. We do care about having peace both in Africa and in other parts of the world. On these great issues we cannot be neutral. But although our policy will not be one of passive neutrality, it will be independent.

Amid loud applause Nyerere declared that Tanganyika would refuse to be the "lobby fodder" of any power:

We give notice now that no one will be able to count on an automatic vote from us simply because we are their friends. Nor should any country which feels unfriendly towards us assume that we shall automatically vote on the opposite side to it. We shall not automatically condemn a policy because it is said to be a communist plot. Nor shall we necessarily oppose a policy because it is described by its opponents as an imperialist intrigue. We shall look at every issue in the light of whether we believe it supports the cause of freedom, of justice, and of peace in the world.

With this definition President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic might be in full agreement.

Africa and the Cold War

The rise of nationalism in Africa came at a fateful moment in world history, though the Africans carry no responsibility for it. As a result of the two great twentieth century wars, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States of America emerged as the two strongest powers on earth. Representing opposite political traditions and philosophies of history and society, they entered into a competition which affected all the peoples of the earth. This competition between the democratic West and the Communist East (Russia and China) aggravated and yet at the same time facilitated the rise of the new nations in Africa and Asia and the rapid march toward equality of Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. Most Arabs and Africans know that they owe their education in the ideas of individual liberty, of human equality and social responsibility to the West. But they have witnessed, too, how much the West sinned by hypocrisy and by disregard of its own principles.

The newly awakened nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America—awakened by the dynamic civilization of the modern West and its message of human rights—do not wish to be directly involved in the struggle between East and West. Their policy of non-alignment resembles that followed by the United States before 1940. They face

the immensely difficult task of improving the lot of their underfed and illiterate masses. Domestic poverty, not outside Communist aggression, seems to them the chief threat to their progress. They are not isolationists. They put their chief hope into the United Nations. Measures to strengthen the United Nations will always find their support.

African states wish to be masters in their own house as much as other nations do, and not junior partners of great powers. They do not trust the wisdom of the great powers implicitly. After all, the two world wars were sparked in Europe and the horrors of communism and fascism did not originate among colored peoples. Their judgment may be sometimes colored by anti-colonial resentment but this resentment is not racial; it is hardly stronger than anti-British feeling has been among the Irish or anti-Austrian feeling among the Czechs. The North American settlers were never offended or humiliated in their human dignity by the British, nevertheless a lively anti-British resentment colored American thinking and feeling for many decades after 1783.

The rise of nationalism everywhere involved an emphasis on being oneself, on tradition and distinctiveness. But progress always, and especially in modern times, demands a mind open to new experiences. It means a break with ancient and restrictive traditions, with the immobilities and authority of caste, tribe and extended family in favor of individuality, social mobility and greater equality.

The problem of the desirable relationship between continuity and innovation, though a universal problem, is of crucial urgency in the modernization of traditional society. Peter I and Lenin in Russia, Robespierre in France, Atatürk in Turkey tried to solve it radically in favor of innovation. But the traditional forms of life showed their continuous efficacy; 40 years after Atatürk's forceful secularization of Turkey, events in 1960 revealed how strongly the villages and the smaller towns remained attached to traditional Islam.

Traditional society seems nowhere so much in need of thorough modernization as in the villages of south and southeast Asia, among the Indians in Latin America and in African tribal society. Only such modern-

ization will make economic progress and national integration possible. Urbanization and industrialization dislocate traditional society and thereby act as potent factors in modernization. In many African countries, trade unions play a far greater role than would correspond to their proportional numerical strength. The labor leaders belong to, or cooperate closely with, the élite of the national movements or governments.

African Leadership

In his inaugural address on March 14, 1960, Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah called upon the working class to form the vanguard in the struggle against poverty, ignorance and disease and to establish a pan-African trade union organization as the foundation of pan-African unity. But so far no common policy of the labor movements in the various countries has crystallized. These movements reflect the variety of the aspirations of the local leadership. Among a largely illiterate people, this leadership, endowed with the means which education, radio, movies and television place into its hands, represents a decisive factor. The future of evolving societies depends much more than do established modern societies upon the quality of the leadership.

This leadership is not democratic in the Western sense of representative government. Representative government as it exists in the English-speaking and in a few northern European countries has not shown consistent promise even in the Latin countries of Europe and America or in central-eastern Europe. It has worked in India where the ruling élite has been trained for more than a century in the English political system. But elsewhere, whether it was in Turkey or in Egypt, parliamentary regimes tended to strengthen the monopoly of the ruling group and were not effective in rooting out traditional corruption. There, as in other more advanced nations which disposed of military establishments, the military showed themselves as the one group which had at least the rudiments of modern efficiency, the discipline of team work, the sense of responsibility for the nation as a whole.

In Europe and Latin America, the officers often stood for the vested interests of the ruling class. In Asia and Africa the officer

personnel was largely drawn from the rising lower classes and was seriously concerned with improving the lot of the masses and carrying through the needed social and economic reforms in order to assure national survival in modern times. In most of Africa, however, no native officer corps existed. There the same role was played by civilian leaders. All of them acted as needed symbols around which the new nations could integrate and pursue common objectives.

In addition, African leadership is young. According to a report from Rhodesia, dated May 31, 1961, in *The New York Times*, Dr. Hastings K. Banda, the popular leader of Nyasaland's Malawi Congress party, has announced the party's candidates for the first democratic elections in the territory. "They include most of his principal lieutenants with an average age of about twenty."

Civilian Leadership

These civilian leaders are supported by their peoples. In the elections held under British supervision in Kenya at the end of February, 1961, Tom Mboya, the leader of the Kenya African National Union, emerged as victor in an election which a Reuters dispatch in *The New York Times* of February 28, described as one in which the new African voters belied European fears of violence and displayed good humor throughout.

It was an enthusiastic election, especially in rural areas where voters reached polling stations by canoe or camel or trekked miles through the bush on foot. Africans displayed tremendous enthusiasm, lining up for six hours to vote in many areas. Most of the 1,300,000 African voters cast ballots for the first time.

Though Mboya was elected with a very great majority, he declared on March 10 that "in the initial stages" a one party government would be "necessary" for stability and for the development of democracy in Kenya. "Danger would come not from traditions or tribalism, but from a struggle for power between the parties. Inevitably this would produce violence and instability." Similar views are held in Ghana and in Tunisia.

Under the very able leadership of Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia is a monolithic but non-totalitarian one-party state. There are elections and according to the electoral law of July 30, 1959, only those born of a Tunisian

father can be elected and only those in possession of Tunisian citizenship for five years can vote. But the elections are strictly one-party elections and all aspects of political life are strictly controlled by the party under Bourguiba's personal dictatorship. No room for open criticism exists. The cult of the personality is a ritual in Tunisian politics. Bourguiba called himself in a speech of June 1, 1959, "the sincere and disinterested spokesman of the national conscience" who "has fought for the cause of the people so much and so well that the course of life of the man and the people have been led to merge."

Like Nasser's Egypt, Bourguiba's Tunisia represents a social as well as a political revolution, in which national unity and solidarity gain at the expense of debate and discussion. Most Tunisians feel that strong opposition movements "would only breed chaos and demagoguery and that the one-party political system may be the only hope for the development of democratic traditions in Africa." Nasser's government, perhaps less monolithic but not more democratic in the Anglo-American sense than Bourguiba's, is the least corrupt and the most popular government Egypt ever had. Nasser gives the people a feeling of participation, of dignity, of being respected and cared for. And that is probably the most which can be expected in the evolving societies of Africa today.

In any case it represents a great step forward compared with the colonial society. And the Africans, north and south of the Sahara, know it.¹

There is today a feeling of hope throughout Africa unknown a very few years ago. In many places the transition has been smooth. In 1961 Sierra Leone, Britain's oldest colony in Africa, celebrated its independence in Freetown, its capital. The Duke of Kent, representing the Queen, handed over to the Sierra Leone Prime Minister, Sir Milton Margai, royal instruments recognizing Sierra Leone as an independent nation. At the same time a special thanksgiving service for Sierra Leone independence was celebrated in St. Paul's Cathedral in London in the presence of high British dignitaries. The

essence lesson at the service was read from the new English Bible by Dr. R. E. Kelfa Caulka, Sierra Leone's Acting High Commissioner in London.

Not everywhere has the transition been as smooth as it was in some of the British West African territories, beginning with Ghana in March, 1957. The tenacity of colonialism in its bad forms has made or is making the transition difficult and cruel in Algeria and Guinea, in the Congo and in Angola, in Rhodesia and in the Union of South Africa. But the wind of change, of which Prime Minister Harold Macmillan spoke so eloquently in South Africa, is blowing everywhere, and not only in Africa. It would be a great mistake, frequently made by "specialists," to consider the African problem fundamentally different from that of Asia, Latin America or the underdeveloped parts of Europe like Spain or Sicily.

Local differences exist everywhere, but the fundamental problem of the adaptation of traditional or medieval societies to modern civilization is the same. Everywhere, following the example of the modern West, the underprivileged, the disinherited, the have-nots aspire to equality. Their rise, necessarily, involves the curtailment of the privileges of the privileged. The tensions and discontents created by this process are utilized by communism for its own purposes. Yet communism did not create the tensions. The example of the West did, whose modern history has been the story of the emancipation of underprivileged classes and groups. The modern West could commit no greater error than to make itself the defender of the status quo and to attribute the changes going

(Continued on page 216)

Hans Kohn has been a student of nationalism for many years. Among his books are *Making of the Modern French Mind* (1955), *American Nationalism* (1957) and *The Idea of Nationalism, A Study in Its Origins and Background*, published in 1944 and now in its seventh printing. His most recent publication is *The Mind of Germany* (1960). He is a contributing editor of *CURRENT HISTORY*.

¹ See on Tunisia, Keith Callard, "The Republic of Bourguiba," *International Journal*, Toronto, Winter, 1960/61, and *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 6, 1961.

Is a federal solution practicable for the newly independent African states? Discussing the forces contributing to African unity, and those which act as barriers, this specialist observes the growth of African blocs and rivalry among them. "Personal rivalry, party politics, last-ditch efforts of the former metropolitan countries and a new dimension, control of trade unions, cut across many national boundaries and interpenetrate regional groupings."

Will African Federalism Work?

By RAYFORD W. LOGAN

Professor of History, Howard University

A UNITED STATES OF AFRICA on either a confederal or a federal basis seems visionary in the early fall of 1961. Regional confederations or federations may be more feasible, especially if they are rooted in customs unions. They may, on the other hand, create new hostile blocs, new "Balkan" leagues. Against the background of a brief comparative study of the United States and Latin America before and after independence, this article assesses the principal disruptive and cohesive forces in "Changing Africa."¹

The 13 American colonies constructed first a confederation and second a federation; the latter has endured for more than 170 years. In Latin America, Haiti proclaimed independence in 1804, most of the Spanish-American nations between 1811 and 1825 and Brazil in 1822. Yet there was never a permanent confederation or federation of even the former Spanish colonies.

Hundreds of Americans,² either by participation or observation, gained experience in self-government in colonial assemblies, town

meetings and county administration. Large numbers learned to read and write—a few at the colleges (Harvard was founded in 1636); more in public schools in New England and by private tutoring in the South; many more, especially women, by self-instruction. The first newspaper appeared in 1704, and by 1777 all the colonies except New Hampshire had one or more papers. An intercolonial postal service, established in 1692, furthered the dissemination of knowledge and correspondence. Since no one religion was strong enough to force itself upon a large majority of the population, religious toleration tended to increase. The number of Indians and of Negroes, slave and free, was relatively small in 1776. Hemmed in between the Atlantic and the mountains, between Anglo-French Canada to the north and Spanish Florida to the south, the colonists achieved the independence of a compact, manageable area. Their language and institutions were primarily English, and England was their only "mother country." Colonization as a school for independence lasted longer in the 13 colonies and prepared a comparatively larger number of men well trained for self-government than in Africa.

By contrast, the Latin American colonies prepared a relatively smaller number of leaders for self-government, especially on the levels comparable to the colonial assemblies

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¹ See also the February, 1961, issue of *Current History*, "Changing Africa."

² The term is imprecise but convenient for the differentiation between the inhabitants of what later became the United States and those of Latin America.

in "English" America. Even the Latin American town assemblies permitted the participation of only a small fraction of the people. Three universities (four if the "University of Santo Domingo" is included) were founded before Harvard, but the percentage of literacy among Europeans, especially women, was much smaller than in the 13 colonies. The Catholic Church dominated government and education in the Latin American colonies except Haiti; it dispensed charity, owned or controlled most of the land and frequently sought to stamp out "heretics," political as well as religious. Newspapers were fewer and generally more ephemeral than in the 13 colonies.

Latin America was much larger than English America; mountains impeded unity even in political subdivisions. Instead of one mother country, Latin America had three: Spain, Portugal and France. Latin America had a much larger percentage of non-whites than did the 13 colonies. This is not to say that non-whites were inherently incapable of participating in self-government, but Latin Americans (like English Americans) generally denied them this participation. Society was more highly stratified and less mobile in the Latin American colonies than in the 13 colonies. Since the wars for independence in Latin America (except Brazil) lasted longer than did the American Revolution, military leaders—many of whom were dictators—made violence the usual pattern for the transfer of independence long after the winning of independence.

Impediments to Unity

With respect to the number of new nations, the Latin American precedent has more relevance than does the United States to contemporary Africa. Eighteen Latin American nations achieved independence from Spain; one each from Portugal and France. Fifteen nations have emerged from *Afrique Noire* and two from French North Africa; three from British Africa; two from Italian Africa, Libya and Somalia (which

includes former British Somaliland); two from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium; one from Belgium.

This fragmentation is far from complete. Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya, and Gambia look forward to independence in the near future. The "wind of change" may bring independence to Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland, South West Africa, French Somaliland, Zanzibar and Pemba, Spanish Guinea and Fernando Po, and at least a part of Algeria. If the Congo (Léopoldville), Uganda, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland should break up into several states, the number of new African states might thus approximate 50; the "old" nations of Ethiopia and Liberia would add two more.³

Neither the Latin American nor the English American precedents have much relevance for contemporary Africa in the evaluation of religion as a potentially disruptive factor. In Africa some indigenous churches constituted a vital element of the nationalist revolts against colonialism. The Islamic presence in Africa, however, adds a dimension which makes a United States of Africa unrealistic.

North Africa is predominantly Muslim as are Mauritania and Sudan. But the percentage of Muslims in other parts of Africa surprises most novitiates in contemporary African history. In 1951 the percentage was as follows: Senegal, 85; Gambia, 84; Guinea, 80; Chad, 77; British Cameroons, 50; Nigeria, 33; Liberia, 20; Tanganyika, 19; Sierra Leone, 11; Nyasaland, 9; Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Togoland, 10 each. The percentage has probably increased.⁴ Frenchmen, especially White Fathers, told the writer in the summer of 1953 that most of the African Muslims "wore their religion like a suit of clothes: it has not penetrated their soul." One might, of course, venture the same criticism with respect to Christianity.

This large percentage of African Muslims, nominal or not, invites meddling. President Nasser of Egypt has at times assumed the role of the political and ideological leader of independence in many parts of Africa. He has beamed radio broadcasts there and provided a large number of scholarships for

³ As this article goes to press in September, 1961, the Union of South Africa appears able to remain the "bastion of white supremacy."

⁴ Articles by George W. Carpenter, Glora M. Wysner and Rayford W. Logan in C. Grove Haines, ed., *Africa Today* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 90-117, 332-336.

study at Al'Azhar University in Cairo. His flirtations with the U.S.S.R. have alienated many African Catholics as has his self-appointed role as the Liberator of Africans in "the jungle."⁵ Black African pilgrims to Mecca have complained of discrimination and exploitation. Orthodox and modernist Muslims contend for control of African Muslims.⁶ Morocco's opposition, supported by the Soviet veto, to the admission of Mauritania to the United Nations has alienated many French African leaders. The acceptance of aid from Israel by some of them further compounds the confusion.

The large number of "races," tribes, languages and dialects is a gigantic obstacle to continental, regional and, in some instances, national unity. Experts differ as to the classification and number of races and tribes. Congo (Léopoldville), according to some estimates, has some 200 tribes. French West Africans speak 126 principal languages and hundreds of dialects. In some regions the inhabitants of neighboring villages do not understand one another. Racial and linguistic problems are somewhat less complex in French Equatorial Africa than elsewhere. A UNESCO publication in 1953 itemized 369 languages and dialects in British African territories. The best guesses as to the number of African "languages" range from 700 to 1,000.⁷

An insufficient number of Africans speak English, French, Portuguese, Flemish, Arabic, Amharic, Swahili, Hausa, Afrikaans or "pidgin English" to provide an adequate base for a common African language. The knowledge of a given metropolitan language by members of the élite may of course tend to provide such a desirable base in British Africa or in French Africa but it may accentuate the cultural and political barriers be-

tween the two areas. Although Portugal has considerably increased the number of schools for non-Europeans in Angola and Mozambique, the illiteracy rate of 99 per cent in 1950 can hardly have been considerably reduced.⁸

Another barrier to African unity is the inadequacy of all communications: railroads, rivers, highways, and air travel. The era of new railroad construction is practically ended; dreams of the Cape-to-Cairo or a Dakar-to-Djibouti railway are "unwarranted." The Senegal is still the only tropical river that permits uninterrupted steamer travel from the coast into the interior, and that only from July to October. But regional groupings "will assuredly lead to the building of new interterritorial highways and the improvement of the few that already exist." An increasing number of non-Europeans are travelling by air and the growing strategic importance of Africa is likely to expand this mode of transport. For the foreseeable future, however, Africans will profit most from the improvement of secondary and less-than-secondary roads and of all the local road networks.⁹

Perhaps the strongest resemblance between Latin America after independence and Africa today consists of the attempts by leaders of one state to extend their power into others. Personal rivalry, party politics, last-ditch efforts of the former metropolitan countries and a new dimension, control of trade unions, cut across many national boundaries and interpenetrate regional groupings.

The continuation of the Cold War adds an almost insuperable burden upon African leaders in their efforts to develop their individual countries and to form economic or political unions. The continuation of the Cold War compels the East and the West to jockey for position in Africa and it imposes upon African leaders hard choices: either firm, consistent support of one of the two blocs or the acceptance of support from one in order to gain more support from the other. One must not expect, during an era of recurring crises, more wisdom from African leaders than from those in other countries.

Forces Favoring Unity

What, now, are the forces which may con-

⁵ Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 109-111.

⁶ Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *French West Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 571-579.

⁷ J. Richard-Molard, *Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1949), pp. 72-77; Henri Ziéglé, *Afrique Equatoriale Française* (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1952), pp. 57, 59, 70; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 145-148, p. 435, footnote 20.

⁸ James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 312-316.

⁹ For a comprehensive analysis, see George H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), I, Ch. 7, "The Waters of the Land," and II, "The Changing Route Map."

tribute to the development of African unities or unity?

Only France established Federations during the colonial period: Madagascar in 1897, French West Africa in 1904 and French Equatorial Africa in 1910. France dismantled these Federations in 1959,¹⁰ but the idea of the federation of two or more of the former component units may have greater vitality there than in other parts of Africa. Yet not even component parts of the former French African Federations have achieved notable progress toward federation, except perhaps the "Union of African States and Madagascar."

The concept of a large Mali Federation, projected in the union of Soudan and Senegal on January 17, 1959, was still-born. Mauritania did not formally join the Federation. Dahomey and the Voltaic Republic withdrew because of the political pressure of Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast who at that time supported France's anti-federation policies. The truncated Mali Federation lasted only until August 20, 1960, when Senegal, alleging meddling by Mali in its internal affairs, withdrew.¹¹ Neither the Council of the Entente (also known as the Sahel-Bénin Entente) of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, the Voltaic Republic and Niger, organized on May 29, 1959, nor the Union of the Republics of Central Africa, established on May 17, 1960, had furthered political federation in the early fall of 1961. Gabon, the richest of former French Equatorial Africa overseas territories, refused to join even the projected customs union.¹²

The most successful of the groupings in former *Afrique Noire* appears to be the "Union of African States and Madagascar." It originated in the Brazzaville Bloc, December, 1960, and includes all the members of

former French West Africa except Guinea and Mali; it includes also the four members of former French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, and the former Trust Territory of French Cameroons (now the Republic of Cameroun). Sylvanus Olympio, President of the former Trust Territory of French Togoland (now the Republic of Togo), did not adhere. The war in Algeria, chaos in the Congo (Léopoldville) and the Soviet veto of Mauritania's admission to the United Nations provided the catalytic agents for the organization of the Bloc. It was not a political organization; it did not even establish a customs union. But it provided for a permanent Inter-State Economic Secretariat to study economic cooperation. At Yaoundé, Cameroun, in the last week of March, 1961, the Brazzaville Twelve adopted the official title of the "Union of African States and Madagascar." The inclusive term was an invitation to other African States to join the Union. Discussions at Yaoundé emphasized the importance of air travel and considered investments by foreign capital and relations with the European Economic Community.¹³ Another meeting at Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, in July, 1961, did not take place.¹⁴

While most of the former members of the three French African Federations were regrouping, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was endeavoring to establish counter-vailing forces. His ultimate aim, it appears, is a United States of Africa. President Nkrumah has maneuvered on four different fronts: The Casablanca Bloc, meetings of Independent African States, the All-African People's Conferences, and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. Almost inevitably, he has encountered opposition. The Casablanca Bloc consists of only the states of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic.

The other independent African States, notably Liberia and Nigeria, have not wished to accept Nkrumah's self-appointed role as leader of a United States of Africa, and they have not wished to become embroiled in President Nasser's extra-African involvements. The All-African People's Conferences, consisting of non-governmental delegates, have also developed more disunity than progress toward a Commonwealth of

¹⁰ Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter, "French-speaking west Africa in Transition," *International Conciliation* (No. 528, May, 1960), p. 402.

¹¹ Helen Kitchen, "Mali Heads for 1960 Independence," *Africa Special Report, IV* (December, 1959), 2, 10; Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *The Republic of Senegal* (December, 1960), p. 3.

¹² Carroll Quigley, "French Tropical Africa: Today and Tomorrow," *Current History, XL* (February, 1961), 85; Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, *The Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)*, January, 1961, p. 4.

¹³ Hella Pick, "The Brazzaville Twelve and How They Came to Be," *Africa Report, VI* (May, 1961), 2, 8, 12, 15.

¹⁴ According to the Malagasy Embassy in Washington, the Conference was re-scheduled for September, 1961.

African States. At the Third Conference, Cairo, March 25–30, 1961, the rift between Nkrumah's followers and the delegates from the Brazzaville Bloc became more vocal than before. Even more ominous was the definite emergence of Nasser as a threat to Kwame Nkrumah's role as the Redeemer of Africa.

African Rivalry

Moreover, the Monrovia Conference of May 8–12, 1961, must be considered, I believe, as a sharp retort to the Cairo Conference. President Tubman of Liberia, who had adumbrated "The Associated States of Africa" in opposition to Nkrumah's United States of Africa, presided. The Presidents of Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta and Congo (Brazzaville) represented their countries. Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Mauritania sent their Prime Ministers. High-level delegations represented Tunisia, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia, and Libya. None of the members of the Casablanca Bloc attended the Conference. The President of the Sudan withdrew his acceptance because he knew that the Conference would not approve Morocco's claims to Mauritania.

Although the Conference expressed the hope that the absentee States would attend the next meeting in Lagos later in 1961, the emergence of Prime Minister Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria as the dominant personality heightened the rivalry between him and Nkrumah for leadership of the former British colonies. This role also underscored a possible power struggle among Nigeria, Liberia, and the French African Community States.

The Monrovia Conference did not, however, establish a federation. One resolution provided for a technical commission of experts to meet in Dakar within three months to work out detailed plans for economic, cultural, scientific, technical, communications and transport cooperation. Other resolutions endorsed the settlement of disputes between African States by peaceful means and, to further this aim, proposed a com-

mission to be attached to the Organization of Cooperation of African and Malagasy States.¹⁵

The shoring up of the alignments in West Africa accelerated soon after the Monrovia Conference. At Strasbourg on June 24, 1961, official representatives of 16 African nations renewed agreements that had been signed prior to independence with representatives of the Common Market. The 16 included the Brazzaville Bloc ("Union of African States and Madagascar"), plus Mali, Togo, Congo (Léopoldville) and Somalia. The new association envisages a special system of tariff preferences, price supports for tropical products and generally enlarged outlets for African exports to the six members of the Common Market. While the recommendations must be approved by the 22 nations and by the Common Market's Executive Commission, observers at Strasbourg believed that approval is likely. Other independent African nations could join the new association, provided that they did not belong to another economic grouping, a clear reference to the tariff system of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

On the same day that representatives of the 16 African States and of the Common Market signed the Strasbourg agreement, announcement was made of the addition, beginning June 27, 1961, of Upper Volta to the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Customs Union and the possibility that Dahomey might become a fifth member. Ghana, Upper Volta, Guinea and Mali form a horse shoe-shaped area surrounding Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. The inclusion of Dahomey would tend to isolate the land-locked Niger Republic. Even without the inclusion of Dahomey, the importance of the Ivory Coast as an outlet and source for goods from and to Upper Volta and Niger would greatly diminish.

Nkrumah achieved on July 1, 1961, in the Union of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali the closest approximation to a federation. The Union's charter provided that "any aggression against one of the states shall be considered an act of aggression against the others." The charter further provided for concerted diplomatic, economic, cultural

¹⁵ *Africa Special Report, IV* (February, 1959), 13; "The Monrovia Conference," *Africa Report, VI* (June, 1961), 5.

(Continued on page 216)

Noting that "like old soldiers most French legal concepts never die, but only fade away," this author believes that the French Community "continues to remain in view even as the tide of events flows on, slowly leaving it behind, stranded on one of the mudbanks of history."

The Franco-African Community in Transition

By KEITH IRVINE
Editor of Africa Weekly

WITHIN the floodstream of African nationalism, two main currents are in evidence. The radical trend is represented, broadly speaking, by the states which today cleave to the position originally established by the independent African states who met in Accra in 1958. The conservative is represented, broadly, by the majority of French-speaking states of the Community who acceded to independence in 1960. Other states, such as Nigeria or Togo, appear to possess affinities with both groups.

Irrespective of which individual states may support one or the other of these two tendencies at any given moment, or what changes may occur in the African "foreign" policies of each state, the existence of interests common to all independent African states has now been recognized. There are no longer states in favor of independence, and others opposed to it, or opposed to it "at this time." All states are for independence, and—it would appear—none will oppose African unity in principle, even though there are those who oppose it "at this time." Despite

reports in the non-African press of a divided Africa, all independent African states now agree on their future direction. There is, however, disagreement as to the pace, and the modalities to be employed.

As in all political situations in which progressives and conservatives differ on the methods to be used to achieve a common goal, there is a marked tendency for the conservative wing to take up as many of the radical ideas as can safely be applied. It might even be said that the political evolution of French-speaking African states has to a considerable degree been spurred forward by initiatives taken by African radicals. Another spur to progress has been provided by the tragic example afforded France by developments in Indochina and French North Africa.

Any examination of the evolution of the Franco-African Community (formerly the French Community) must necessarily fall into two parts—the evolution of the Community before the independence of the Community states in 1960, and developments that have taken place since then.

From Colonies to Community

From the historical standpoint, political progress in French-speaking Africa may be viewed as rapid. A mere 16 years ago the French colonial empire in Africa still existed intact. Forced labor ("la corvée") had only just been abolished as a legal institution. Today the inhabitants of these territories have gained the status of citizens of independent states.

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The Allied ideals of freedom in the second world war resulted in a French climate that favored for a time political progress. Under these circumstances a single political party arose in French-speaking Africa to exert influence in many different territories. This was the *Rassemblement Democratique Africain* (R.D.A.) under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny.

The establishment of the R.D.A.—the precursor of the independence movement in French-speaking Africa—was followed by other developments that also influenced the course of events in the area. The radical change of direction in British West African policy (following the rise to power of Kwame Nkrumah and the C.P.P. in the Gold Coast), and the violent collision of colonial forces with nationalist forces in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, all led to a change in the prevailing psychology. In order to make tactical concessions to the gathering forces of colonial emancipation, without being hampered by right-wing opposition within the French National Assembly and Senate, a *loi-cadre* (framework law) was enacted on June 23, 1956. This law was called the “framework law” because it provided a framework within which the administration could, at a time of its own choosing, accord political progress to French colonial areas by decree. In 1957, under the provisions of the “loi-cadre,” therefore, a considerable degree of autonomy was granted to the different territories of “France Overseas.” This was the terminology used for the nascent Community in order to avoid the use of such unfashionable terms as “French colonies,” or the “French Empire.”

The concept of the French Community was advanced by General de Gaulle. In this, as in other matters, he has succeeded in conveying at least an impression of permanence, whereas his predecessors succeeded only in conveying an impression of frenzied shifts and frantic expedients. After his accession to power in the summer of 1958, the text of the proposed Constitution of the Fifth French Republic was submitted by referendum not only to the electorate of metropolitan France, but also to the populations of the French dependencies overseas. As was observed at the time, a considerable risk to

French power was inherent in the holding of such a referendum. A negative answer from a non-metropolitan territory was to be taken as a clear indication that that territory did not wish to join the Community, but chose independence instead.

In fact, when the referendum was held, Guinea was the only territory to vote “No” to the constitutional referendum. De Gaulle kept his word, and took no active step to prevent Guinea from proclaiming its independence. No stone was left unturned by France, however, to ensure that conditions under which Guinea acceded to sovereignty were made as difficult as possible, to the point where the new state stood in some danger. Had the independence of Guinea in fact proved a failure, supporters of the pro-colonial cause would have been able to substantiate to some extent their claim that “Africans are not ready to govern themselves—look at what happened to Guinea!”

This argument, however, was denied to them. Instead, the leaders of the French-speaking African territory watched with keen interest Guinea’s struggle for survival in the face of the strongest adverse pressures. When Guinea survived they were able to conclude that even without the aid of France, and despite an energetically hostile diplomatic campaign launched against it, a new-born African state could maintain its sovereignty within the international community.

The lesson went home. The resulting political pressures within French Africa sounded the deathknell of the Community as originally envisaged, and led to the granting of independence in 1960 to all the states of the French Community. Thus the holding of the September, 1958, referendum, which led to the establishment of the French Community, also led to its eventual dismantlement, although the process took two years.

Once the results of the 1958 referendum were known, the territories that had voted for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, and consequently for the establishment of the Community, began to proclaim themselves “autonomous republics within the French Community”—a process completed in December, 1958. At the same time, the organs of the new Community were methodically established. By April, 1959, the Execu-

tive Council, the Senate, and the Court of Arbitration had been established, and by July they were ready to function. As with the "loi-cadre," however, the new French institutions once more failed to take into account the pace of colonial political development. The effect of Guinea's example was not diminished by news of the forthcoming independence of Cameroun, Nigeria and Togo in West Africa, and of Somalia in East Africa. The acceleration of political progress in the Belgian Congo was another spur towards the future.

By the end of 1959, anti-Community, or pro-independence, movements had gathered great momentum within individual Community states. France—unable to countenance the prospect of Algerian-style nationalist uprisings taking place at several points in French-speaking Africa—began to prepare to accord independence to those states that wanted it in 1960. At the same time, the Mali Federation (comprising the Republics of Senegal and the Soudan) had a delegation in Paris to make arrangements for negotiating an independent status. The Malagasy Republic was the next state member of the Community to request France for its independence. After 1959, the year of hesitation, was over, came 1960, the year of independence. Whereas on January 1, 1960, the Community was technically functioning, and all its member states held the status of autonomous republics, by December, 1960, all 12 autonomous republics had become independent, and had been granted jurisdiction over foreign policy, defense, currency, financial and economic policy, and policy with regard to strategic raw materials. In some cases later agreements restored to France effective jurisdiction in certain of these matters; but even in these cases power even if only technically and for a brief period had been vested in the new African state itself.

The Community, in effect, never had time to function satisfactorily. The Executive Council—where representatives of the Community states listened to a series of announcements concerning matters that were often beyond their jurisdiction—held six meetings in 1959 and a seventh and final meeting in March, 1960. The Executive Council was then replaced by a periodic Community Con-

ference, comparable in some respects to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. The Community Senate was replaced, in 1960, by a Consultative Interparliamentary Senate. This was formed of delegates from the legislative assemblies of Community member states, although the precise functions of the new body have still to be defined. The Community Court of Arbitration, which never had any dispute referred to it, maintained its name but altered its character in 1960. No longer was it empowered to hand down rulings: instead procedures of conciliation and of arbitration were to be set in motion when a dispute was submitted to the Court. "Judges," moreover, were to be replaced by "arbitrators."

The Changing Community

The transformation of the Community (called either the "New Community," or the "Franco-African Community" after 1960) was accompanied by a reduction in its numbers. In the course of 1960 the Republic of Mali (formerly the Soudan) left the Community, as did the four states of the Conseil de l'Entente (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta). As the two former U.N. Trust Territories under French administration, Cameroun and Togo, did not join the Community after gaining their independence, the number of Community states, after all these developments, fell from the original twelve to seven. At the present time (July, 1961) the Franco-African Community—a watered-down version of the original Community concept—consists, apart from France, of the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (capital Brazzaville), Gabon, the Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, and Senegal.

The circumstances under which Mali and the four states of the Conseil de l'Entente left the Community are not without interest. The now defunct Mali Federation, consisting of the autonomous republics of Senegal and of the Soudan, was the first territorial unit of the Community to approach France and request independence. For the sake of creating a larger territorial unit, the Mali Federalists insisted on negotiating independence as a single entity, rather than separately, as Senegal and Soudan. Independence was

in due course agreed upon, but only after the new Federation had also agreed to sign certain accords of cooperation with France. These agreements restricted Mali's liberty of action in various fields, including defense. On August 20, 1960, the Mali Federation disintegrated when Senegal seceded. The Soudan, however, adopted the former federal flag as its own, and took the name of the Mali Republic. (Mali, like Ghana and like Songhai, is the name of an ancient African kingdom.) At the same time Mali seceded from the Community, and declared that the agreements signed with France did not apply to the new Republic of Mali. Meanwhile Senegal remained within the Community, and remained bound by the agreements concluded with France.

Other circumstances led to the separation of the Entente states (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta) from the Community. Originally the Conseil de l'Entente had been formed by Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, backed by France. The Conseil de l'Entente as a form of customs union was to provide a loose grouping of French-speaking African states in opposition to the then rising star of the more radical Mali Federation.

The rivalry between the states and the statesmen of Senegal and the Ivory Coast had, however, deeper roots. Both Senegal and the Ivory Coast had for some time contested for French economic and political favors. Historically, since Napoleonic times, Senegal had enjoyed favored status in French eyes. Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast had, in the 1940's, rallied the remainder of French Africa around the banner of the R.D.A., focusing existing discontents to such a degree that France, in order to diminish escalating pressures, was obliged to come to terms with Houphouët. His terms were: favored treatment for his natal Ivory Coast. The terms were accepted, and Houphouët's position, formerly a revolutionary one, became markedly pro-French. At the same time the economic development of the Ivory Coast progressed to an unprecedented degree.

This situation continued to prevail throughout the 1950's. However, when Houphouët saw that Senegal had obtained

independence before the Ivory Coast, thus weakening his political position which was already under heavy attack for its Franco-philia, he took a fresh initiative. His resolve was no doubt strengthened by the fact that his relations with French officials of the Community became strained as the French seemed to him to be taking his pro-Gallicism too much for granted. On June 3, 1960, after independence had already been accorded in principle to a number of Community states in return for signatures to the restrictive agreements of defense and cooperation, Houphouët's Entente states made public their request for independence *without the conclusion of preliminary agreements*.

To see France's staunchest African ally come forward with such a radical demand at such an embarrassing moment caused great anger in Paris. Only the previous day—June 2—the Senate of the Community had adopted the amendments to Articles 85 and 86 of the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, the final step in a constitutional evolution which made independence for all Community states legally possible. This development weakened the hand of the French negotiators. Thus Houphouët's delay, which had appeared at first as an arch-conservative disinclination for independence, was revealed as a tactical delay designed to oblige the French to make concessions and amend the Constitution before he himself presented his demands.

After the first explosions of anger at Houphouët's "treachery," a sudden silence supervened in official circles. Then, on July 11, the four states of the Entente signed agreements with France providing for their *unconditional* accession to independence. Houphouët's tactics had succeeded. Whereas several months later agreements of cooperation were signed between France and states of the Entente, these agreements were considerably less restrictive than those signed with other Community states, due to the fact that independence could no longer be raised as a bargaining point by the French. Furthermore, although the Entente states clearly showed that they intended to continue good relations with France, and although Houphouët returned to his habitual pro-French position, after the accession of the four states

to independence on various dates in the first week of August, 1960, none of them remained a member of the Community.

"African States of French Expression"

Indeed, from the time of the Abidjan Conference of October, 1960, it became clear that, as with previous French concepts, such as "France d'Outremer," or the framework of the "loi-cadre," the Community was itself being supplanted by a new concept—that of "African States of French Expression."¹ That is not to say that the Community has "died." Like old soldiers, most French legal concepts never die, but only fade away. The "loi-cadre" is still a statutory instrument with all the force of law, although it can no longer apply to current circumstances. So with the Community, which continues to remain in view even as the tide of events flows on, slowly leaving it behind, stranded on one of the mudbanks of history.

The new grouping of "African States of French Expression" is so loose in form that it enjoys none of the legal binding force to which the French attach so great an importance. Its most affirmative manifestation has been the Abidjan Conference of October, 1960, followed by the Brazzaville Conference of December, 1960, followed by the Dakar Conference of February, 1961, and the Yaounde Conference in March, 1961. The governments represented at these conferences were precisely those which were able publicly to express, in varying degrees, attachment to France.

¹ It almost seemed, at one moment, as if the late Barthélemy Boganda's dream of a "United States of Latin Africa"—including all the former French, Belgian, and Portuguese African territories—was to be revitalized. But the moment for that has clearly passed. African states of English and also of Arabic expression must also be taken into account.

² The pattern of political development in West Africa in the immediate future was described recently by an international civil servant in the following terms: Referring to the local "Hi-Life" dance, he commented: "Hi-Life is a highly individualized dance. At times each partner sways off on his or her own, rapt in his or her own personality. But the partners rejoin without recrimination and eventually a community interdependence among all the dancers begins to become manifest."

And yet, since then, other forces have come into play. On the conservative side, the Monrovia Conference of May, 1961, grouped together not only states of French expression, but also English-speaking states. On the radical side, some of the former Community states, such as Dahomey and Upper Volta, have broken from the ranks and formed close and friendly links with English-speaking Ghana. The symbolic breaking down of the customs barrier at Paga on June 27, 1961, after Upper Volta and Ghana had agreed to open the border, demonstrated clearly that future relations among West African states were at least unlikely to be based upon allegiance to any former metropolitan power. France, it was clear, was losing direct control of events in French-speaking Africa. Both Monrovia and Paga provided proof of this.

New Goals

African states of French expression are, for their part, today beginning to seek new goals and to apply new policies. Cautious and conservative in their first steps, they show signs of becoming progressively bolder and more independent as they grow accustomed to their new-found freedom. For some time to come, however, the policies that they wish to follow will be modified by their need for financial aid to develop their economies. As long as the West, which will presumably supply the larger proportion of this aid, maintains a conservative approach to a revolutionary Africa, a brake will be placed upon the movement towards African unity. Even the most conservative French-speaking African leaders, such as Leopold Senghor, have however openly approved goals such as the establishment of a "United States of West Africa" by 1963. The struggle for African independence is already over in principle, and is now approaching its final conclusion in practice. A new struggle—the struggle for African unity—has now begun.²

"A parallel can be drawn between the emergence of the 12 Latin American states that gained their independence in the 20-year period 1821-40 and the emergence of 6 African states in the 10-year period 1950-1959, but nothing in history can be equated with the creation of the 16 new African independent states during the calendar year 1960."—G. Etzel Pearcy, "Africa: Names and Concepts," Department of State Bulletin, December 26, 1961

Whether Algeria remains French or becomes independent, it will have to grapple with "the deepening plight of the Muslims," warns this writer. "As the population multiplies at the high rates indicated. . . , the present resources will be unable to furnish the new millions of Muslims with even a subsistence level of existence."

Algeria: Tiger by the Tail

By DONALD J. HARVEY

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ONE HUNDRED and thirty years of French rule have transformed Algeria into a land of striking contrasts and incredible complications. No simple "declaration of independence" by the Algerians—even if amicably recognized by the French—can hope to harmonize the contrasts or resolve the complications in the immediate future. Algeria has not been, is not now, nor will ever be like the Congo. Algeria has been, for better or for worse, more than a mere colony and less than an integral part of a modern state. Its problems are of two varieties: *i.e.*, Algeria is an underdeveloped or semi-developed country seeking to make the transition to a modern state; and it is also a "colony" attempting to move and adjust to a status of independence. Algeria must face simultaneously all the difficulties inherent in both categories of problems.

The year 1830 marked the beginning of operations which ultimately led to the French acquisition of Algeria. In the decades following the occupation of the three major seaports (Algiers, Oran, and Bône), French

expeditionary forces penetrated and extended their control over the interior. By the twentieth century, the major portion of the Sahara was added to "Algeria." The military demands of the French conquest and the intermittent clashes with local tribal groups tended to give the army ascendancy or at least great weight in the administration of the colony. All conceivable types of colonial administrative systems were attempted during the nineteenth century, but Napoleon III made the chief breakthrough in the direction of civilian control. The Third Republic continued this pattern by creating at first three *départements* in Algeria under the French Minister of the Interior.

The *colons* (European settlers) were dissatisfied with Paris domination and secured a degree of self-government by 1900. At this time, Financial Delegations were formed which had jurisdiction over the Algerian budget. Membership in this body guaranteed the *colons* predominance by granting this small fraction of the total Algerian population 48 seats to the Muslim share of eventually 24.

Little structural change took place in the twentieth century until the ferment of World War II resulted in the substitution of an Algerian Assembly for the Financial Delegations. The Assembly's powers, however, were severely limited by the French-appointed Governor-General and by the French National Assembly itself. Even this half-way house was razed in 1956, two years after the rebellion disrupted normal governmental practices. Emergency decree powers became the rule for the remaining years of the Fourth

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French Republic and for the first three years of the Fifth Republic. Institutional reforms by General Charles de Gaulle since 1958 provided a setting within which many Muslims might have acquired valuable political and administrative experience; but this opportunity was largely frustrated by mounting resentment against the French and by fear of terrorist reprisals by the rebel organizations.

Muslim Status

Within this administrative-political framework, the vast majority of "native" Algerians were classed as French subjects, but not French citizens, until after World War II. The Jews were early singled out for French citizenship by the Crémieux law of 1870. Both the Second Empire in 1865 and the Third Republic primarily in 1919 passed token legislation to enable Algerians to acquire a qualified French citizenship. In almost all cases before 1944, however, a Muslim was compelled to abandon Koranic law and Muslim customs, and to accept French civil status, in order to receive a French citizenship which still would not entitle the convert to rights identical with those of a Frenchman in France. Very few Muslims allowed themselves of this type of largesse.

Colon opposition prevented the Popular Front of 1936 from passing a more liberal citizenship bill sponsored by the Socialist Premier, Léon Blum, and a former Governor-General of Algeria, Maurice Viollette. This proposal would have granted citizenship to certain educated Muslims without demanding forfeiture of Muslim status. This reform was substantially effectuated, however, by an ordinance of General de Gaulle in 1944. Finally, in 1946, the French Parliament placed all Algerians on equal legal footing by granting French citizenship to all inhabitants of Algeria.

Equality before the law did not by any means signify equality to enact law. The Statute of 1947 gave infinitely greater representation to the Muslims in the newly-established Algerian Assembly, but the shortcomings were quickly noted by politically-hungry citizens. Half the 120 members of the Assembly were selected by 469,023 Europeans and 63,194 Muslims; the other

half, by 1,301,072 Muslims. The European *colon* minority could dominate the Muslim majority through this two-college system, and also through the device of requiring a two-thirds vote on any action upon the request of the Governor-General or of one-quarter of the Assembly's membership. The adoption of a single electoral college as well as other potentially far-reaching reforms initiated since 1958 by General de Gaulle, like the institutional changes, have been robbed of effectiveness by the tensions inherent in the bloody civil war.

Economic and Social Setting

Official French publications have frequently presented glowing accounts of the economic and social development of Algeria. In many respects the French may take justifiable pride in their achievement during the past 130 years and especially since World War II.

The relatively static nineteenth century population of Algeria mounted from little over 2 million in 1830 to 4.7 million in 1901, and to 5.7 million in 1921. The official censuses of 1948 and 1954 and the estimate of 1960 revealed not growth but population explosion:

	<i>Colons</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Totals</i>
1948	974,000	7,708,000	8,682,000
1954	1,042,000	8,486,000	9,528,000
1960	1,000,000	9,300,000	10,300,000

Demographic projections of the Muslim figures assume 40 million by the year 2,000, while the European numbers remain stable. Other elements need introduction here. There should be counted also the 400,000-500,000 Muslims who have migrated to Metropolitan France, and the half-million French Army soldiers in Algeria. The significance of these two groups will be noted shortly. It is of some interest, too, to realize that half of the *colons* are of French origin; the remainder, of Italian, Spanish or other backgrounds.

Whereas Algiers was the only city of more than 50,000 in 1830, there were 11 others in this bracket by 1961. The French Embassy's pamphlet "Basic Data on Algeria," dated May, 1961, informs us that \$20 billion have been invested by the French in foster-

ing the building and operation of 2,700 miles of railroads, 28,000 miles of roads, 20 sea-ports, 55 power plants, 138 hospitals and health centers, and a sizeable educational system. Not to be overlooked is the equipment for the exploitation of petroleum resources of the Sahara—oil and natural gas for ultimate industrial power usage. Agriculture (grain, wines, citrus fruits) and industry produced exportable goods worth nearly \$400 million in 1960. Imports to Algeria amounted to \$1.3 billion in the same year. Eighty per cent of this exchange was with Metropolitan France. Many an Arab or African state might well envy the degree of Algeria's modernization.

A careful analysis and interpretation of these and other statistics, however, do not fully cover the French with the glory in which they might wish to be cloaked. French government surveys conducted in 1955 by Mastiépol and Delavignette revealed many basic economic and social disadvantages of the Muslim *vis-à-vis* the European settler.

Although it is incorrect to portray even a sizeable minority of the one million *colons* as lordly plantation holders or as plutocratic merchants, bankers, or industrialists, the *colons* have demonstrably a social and economic status far superior to that of the Muslims. Of the 15 million arable acres in Algeria, 25,000 *colons* owned nearly half (6,875,000 acres), whereas 15,000 Muslims possessed only 1,875,000 acres under modern methods of cultivation. Still entrapped in archaic systems of agriculture were 500,000 Muslims holding 6.25 million acres. The averages are deceptive: *colons*, 275 acres per farm; "modern" Muslims, 150 acres; traditional Muslims, 12.5 acres. Actually, in 1951, one out of three *colons* held fewer than 25 acres, thus indicating the inequitable distribution even among the European settlers. But at least two out of three Muslims possessed fewer than 25 acres.

A majority, but not all of the *colons*, thus dominated the modern agricultural sector, leaving proportionately little land for many Muslims. The per capita income of nearly 6 million rural Algerians averaged only \$45 per year in 1951. Unable to feed the increasing numbers on their small farms, many

Muslims watched the "desertion" of members of their families to the Algerian cities, to Metropolitan France, or to the armed forces of the rebellion. Still others entered into the category of agricultural laborers on the farms of the *colons*. The population explosion, however, was as responsible for this phenomenon as was French or *colon* policy.

Unlike the Muslims who are 75 per cent rural, the *colons* are at least 75 per cent urban. In 1954, the size of each group in the non-agricultural sectors of the economy was as follows:—commerce: 64,000 *colons*, 96,000 Muslims; administration and services: 84,000 *colons*, 73,000 Muslims; mining, power and processing industries: 106,000 *colons*, 172,000 Muslims. The Mastiépol and Delavignette reports of 1955 shed light on the relative status of these groups. Here, too, as in agriculture, the disparity among the *colons* is not so great as that between *colon* and Muslim.

The per capita income, which is not to be confused with the amount of wages of any individual workman, was \$121 per year in 1951 for 1.6 million out of 2.2 million urban Muslims. 510,000 reached \$240 per year, while 50,000 averaged \$502. In contrast, the minimum per capita income for 440,000 *colons* amounted to \$240; for 545,000, \$502; for 15,000, \$3181. Not to be omitted from the income analysis are the funds sent home by the 400,000 to 500,000 Muslims who have migrated to Metropolitan France often on a temporary basis. Most observers have calculated that nearly two million Muslims in Algeria are entirely or partially supported in this fashion.

From these statistics, it would appear that the *colons* monopolize the executive, managerial, entrepreneurial positions. Yet many urban *colons* are in the same income bracket as the Muslims, both serving as lawyers, doctors, artisans, shopkeepers, taxicab drivers, clerks, civil servants, telephone operators and as skilled or unskilled workers. However, only one out of 20 Muslims has arrived at the level in which one out of two *colons* is so "poorly" situated in comparison to the wealthier *colons*. Although one-quarter to one-third of the Muslims have shifted or been shifted from a primitive to a modern money economy, they have thus

not reaped the same benefits as the European settlers. To the credit of the French, this transition has taken place in Algeria, while other African and Arab lands have been more nakedly exploited without any tangible modernization of the particular "colony" or "subjects." To their discredit, the French and, more especially, the *colons* have barred the Muslims from political, social, and economic advantages proportionate to Muslim numbers and contributions.

Illiteracy

One important indication, as well as cause, of this inequity has been the lack of education of the Muslims. Until the civil war broke out in 1954, illiteracy was the rule among over 90 per cent of the Muslims; a fact explained both by the lack of facilities and by the reluctance of Muslim parents to send their children to French schools. Primary and secondary school space and staff were available, nevertheless, for all the children of the *colons*. In higher education, the 6,000 student enrollment at the University of Algiers included only 500–600 Muslims.

Almost all the statistics offered above referred to the Algerian scene of 1954, the last year in which French rule was not effectively challenged. Since that date, the festering rebellion and the advent of the Fifth Republic have wrought tremendous changes. Successive ministries of the Fourth Republic took faltering steps to improve the political, economic, and social status of the Muslims, while simultaneously applying increasing military pressure against rebel action of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). These measures of development and repression proved ineffective in the face of *colon* resistance to concessions, parliamentary indecision and continued growth of the F.L.N.

The Constantine Plan

From General de Gaulle, head of the Fifth Republic, emanated an ambitious and enlightened "Constantine Plan" for Algeria. Announced by de Gaulle in October, 1958, and reported in a May, 1961, French Embassy publication, this five-year plan scheduled an investment of \$4 billion, allocated approximately equally among the following sectors of activity: "25 per cent for public facilities (education, public health,

administration and communications); 25 per cent for housing and urban development; 25 per cent for heavy equipment (power, heavy industry, soil conservation and restoration); 25 per cent for light equipment (agriculture, light industry and services)." This belated crash program was intended to raise the average per capita income to \$400 per year, to introduce more Muslims into modern economic life, to reduce radically Muslim illiteracy, and politically to woo Muslims into association with France.

During the past two years, the Constantine Plan has certainly accelerated the modernization of Algeria. The discovery, exploitation and utilization of Saharan resources promise to achieve even greater results through easy access to natural gas for power needs and the ultimate establishment of steel and chemical industries. In housing, much has been accomplished by razing many of the *bidonvilles* (shanty-towns) around major urban areas. Country "towns" have sprung up with better shelter for the inhabitants. Increasing numbers of Muslims have received formal education in new schools or in centers established and directed by branches of the French Army.

Despite the significant material advances, the political and military atmosphere—supercharged with stormy *colon* uprisings, army *putsches* and unrelenting rebel action—had hardly been propitious for strong French sympathies on the part of the mass of the Muslims. The F.L.N. persisted in its demands for an independent Algeria.

History of the F.L.N.

By 1954, heightened nationalism in Arab and African "colonies," repeated failures by the French to make adequate political concessions to the Muslims in Algeria, mounting misery of the exploding Muslim population—these and derivative factors contributed to the formation of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) for organized rebellion against French rule. The F.L.N. challenge and the French response led through the paths of terror and repression to complicate still further the already complicated interrelationships of the French government, the 500,000-man French Army, the 1 million European settlers, the 9 million Muslims, and the F.L.N.

After nearly four years of increasingly intensive efforts by the French and the rebels, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.) grew out of the F.L.N. The same years witnessed the Algerian-induced collapse of the Fourth French Republic and the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle. The attempts by the F.L.N. and the French governments of 1954–1961 to come to an accommodation on the Franco-Algerian relationship repeatedly fell short of success.

The position of the F.L.N. has been, in comparison to that of successive French governments, the more constant, firm, and rigid. The F.L.N. demands of 1961 have barely varied from those of 1954, whereas de Gaulle's declared stand of 1961 has indeed shown a tremendous variance from the earlier French reaction. The 1961 pronouncements of the Algerian representatives at Evian-les-Bains recalled the F.L.N.'s initial November 1, 1954, proclamation which Michael Clark reported as desiring "negotiations with the authorized spokesmen of the Algerian people, on the basis of a recognition of Algerian sovereignty . . . [and] ending all legal action against the combatant forces."

In return, the F.L.N. offered to respect French cultural and economic interests. Those French citizens who wished to remain in Algeria would be allowed to choose either their original nationality or a new Algerian citizenship. If they chose the former status, they would be duly treated as foreigners; if they selected the latter, they would be considered equals, in rights and duties, to all Algerian nationals.

The Fourth Republic had not the inclination or the power to deem Algeria other than French, or to "abandon" 1 million Frenchmen. As the Fourth Republic appeared less and less capable or desirous of maintaining this original position by 1958, the "1 million Frenchmen" and the French Army managed an uprising which ushered in the Fifth Republic. The new government of General de Gaulle seemed to offer hope to all factions in the Algerian (and other) quarrels.

Like the heads of the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle refused to recognize the F.L.N.'s exclusive jurisdiction or representational monopoly in Algeria. Like the Fourth Re-

public, too, de Gaulle long insisted on a cease-fire prior to discussion. Nor was de Gaulle apparently able or willing unconditionally to withdraw the French Army from acting as the upholder of the previously-indicated privileges and powers of the French and the *colons*. The presence, activities, and particular interests of the army have in themselves had a weighty influence.

By 1961, however, the relatively unchanging F.L.N. demands were countered by a new French offer of negotiations without a previous cease-fire, and with the recognition of the ultimate right of self-determination by the inhabitants of Algeria. Algeria, meanwhile, had been geographically re-defined to exclude the Saharan region. During the Evian-les-Bains discussions, de Gaulle ordered a "cease-fire" or at least a halt in French offensive operations against the rebels. Thus, when the discussions were suspended in June, 1961, the two parties were still at public odds over: (1) methods of implementing self-determination; (2) guarantees for the *colons* in an "independent" Algeria; (3) title to the Sahara. At stake also was the territorial integrity of an Algeria which the French government implied might be partitioned for the protection of French and *colons'* interests.

The Hard Road Ahead

Regardless of the outcome of this year's negotiations to decide whether Algeria will be French, autonomous, or independent, the citizens of both countries will be confronted with problems of a dynamic and dangerous nature. Germaine Tillion's brilliant book, *Algeria: the Realities*, vividly portrays and ominously foreshadows the deepening plight of the Muslims. As the population multiplies at the high rates indicated above, the present resources will be unable to furnish the new millions of Muslims with even a subsistence level of existence. Independent or French, Algeria will be obliged to institute gigantic development programs similar to the over-due Constantine Plan. Soil erosion control, land reclamation projects, possible redistribution of existing land holdings, application of modern technology to agriculture—all these are mandatory if the exploding population is to be fed.

To supply other necessities, to provide gainful employment for the unemployed and the underemployed, to exploit the natural resources of Algeria, an enormous effort will be required. Heavy and light industry must be encouraged; mushrooming urban and rural housing needs must be met; and educational facilities must have high priority. Whether from French or foreign sources, capital and technical assistance will be required to supplement local re-investment to accelerate the transition from an underdeveloped, "archaic" economy to a modern one.

Related to this problem is the multifaceted one of the European settlers. As has been observed, these *colons* possess and direct the most advanced agricultural, commercial, and industrial enterprises. Their investments and property might be expropriated for distribution to the less fortunate Muslim, but their skills and talents could not be quickly replaced. Politically and socially, too, the presence of the *colons* may raise as many difficulties for an independent Algeria as it has for French Algeria. It can hardly be with light heart or good grace that this influential, sizeable minority will envision the loss of its privileged position. Extremists among this group have in the past and will undoubtedly in the future engage in more than parliamentary maneuvering for the preservation or advancement of their hitherto superior status.

The French Army, alone or in concert with the *colons*, still remains a volatile force. The conditions, timing, and nature of its withdrawal from Algeria will have important implications for the Muslim attitude toward and treatment of the *colons* and the French government. The evacuation of the French Army will remove one thorn from the sensitive sides of Muslim nationalists, and will obviously eliminate recurrence of brutal repression and cruel torture. Yet the departure of the Army will also remove thousands of young Frenchmen whose constructive work in education, agriculture, and housing has been noteworthy.

The retirement of the French Army would appear to carry this corollary: the power vacuum will be filled by the F.L.N. with its administrative and military apparatus. How deeply has its terroristic method been in-

grained? How united is the Front and the Provisional Government? Will there be severe retribution against Muslims who have not wholeheartedly supported the F.L.N., or who "collaborated" with French authorities, or bent to French pressure. What treatment will be accorded the technically useful *colon*-minority whose attitudes and policies in the past have helped breed rebellion, hatred, and terror? Will there be a fratricidal struggle for political ascendancy among the many factions of the Provisional Government into whose camp French foolishness or wickedness has driven even moderate Muslims?

An Army of Liberation without a further military cause and without hopes for fruitful employment in a civilian capacity is never a stabilizing element in a society. The return from Tunisia, Morocco, or Algerian hiding places of several hundred thousands of Muslims—civilian or military—can hardly help the already saturated Algerian economy. Furthermore, an exclusion of the nearly half a million Algerians from the Metropolitan labor market would involve double tragedy for Algeria since there would be not only the loss of precious funds from the workers in France, but also the need to absorb the repatriated group in the new and overpopulated Algerian homeland.

By no means an issue purely unto itself is the Sahara. Detached from Algeria in 1958 at the moment when suspected natural wealth was beginning to be transmuted into tangibly exploited riches, the Sahara holds the promise that Algeria—and indeed other North African states and France herself—may take giant steps in economic growth. The possession of or easy access to the annual billions of barrels of oil and natural gas would furnish capital and power for Algeria's modernization. Yet, here again, French and foreign capital and technology are essential for a rapid utilization of these resources.

On the international level, enough has been written of how French rule in Algeria has created and perpetuated friction with Tunisia, Morocco, and other Arab-African states. French control over Algeria has similarly exacerbated relations with the United States, Nato, the Soviet Union and Communist China. Independence will not

automatically end the international involvement of an Algerian Republic. The conflict and identity of interests with Tunisia and Morocco—*vis-à-vis* the Sahara, for example—would appear to call for some form of regularization. Lorna Hahn's study in *Africa Today Pamphlets: 1* analyzed well the choices and difficulties of a North African confederation of which Algeria would obviously be the strongest member. The orientation of Algerian foreign policy toward the non-Arab world will be decided upon a broad basis of such tangible considerations as the subsequent actions and attitudes of France and the major world powers, the availability of investments, loans, or grants, and the imponderable elements of intensified nationalism and socio-economic ideological stance.

The "curse" of colonialism in Algeria—

hardly admissible in official French quarters—has been accompanied by the "blessings" of French rule—conversely inadmissible in F.L.N. circles. Algeria has been exploited, Muslims have been relegated to an inferior status, but there has been created and developed—for whatever motives—many of the trappings of a modern economy. Urbanization, industrialization, agricultural improvement, modern sanitation, and an expanded educational system are increasingly characteristic of the Algerian scene. Peopling this scene are growing numbers of politically-sophisticated Muslims familiar with and technically trained in the ways of a money economy. With assets far greater than many an African or Arab country, the Algerians may be able to create a North African showcase after a decade or so of difficult but not insurmountable problems.

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on to the influence or plots of communism. Thereby the West would play communism's game.

Some Western representatives have at times used language which seemed to express a racial or cultural superiority complex or a hard boiled "realistic" *Machtpolitik* of alleged strategic interests. The Communists never use this language. Even less should the West, not because of any international popularity contest to "win" the non-committed nations, but because such language

and the underlying sentiment run counter to the spirit of modern civilization and undermine its ethos. The revolution of the third quarter of the twentieth century, in which Africa forms one of the pivotal points, challenges the West. Above all the two great nations, Britain and the United States, in which democracy rests on solid foundations, must understand the historical forces at work, their origin and nature, and must not sacrifice their own values and their own future to the alleged and shifting needs of a current power struggle.

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and research activities among the three countries. President Nkrumah declared that the Union constitutes a "nucleus of a United States of Africa" and that it will be open to all African States wishing to join it and to accept its aims and objectives. This virtual military alliance not only challenged the Monrovia Bloc but more definitely the Union of African States and Malagasy. For the latter also invites the adherence of other African States. Thus, these steps toward federation are likely to impede rather than to promote a United States of Africa.

The white-supremacy policies of the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal in her "overseas provinces" might provide the overriding force for the

union of other parts of Africa. But African leaders should not be so shortsighted as to make hatred of white people the principal cement for their short-range aims of federations or their long-range dreams of a United States of Africa. For hatred is a disease; it could easily extend to black Africans and spread beyond the borders of Africa. Perhaps the best remedy for this disease would be the determination to prove to the rest of the world that Africans are not only capable of governing themselves but of contributing to international peace and security by first establishing peace and security among themselves. In so doing, African leaders would also destroy the last subterfuge of Verwoerd, Welensky and Salazar for continuing "man's inhumanity to man."

This article examines the coming of independence to British East and Central Africa. In this discussion of the development of self-government for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, the author portrays the struggle between white and black and among the African political groupings themselves for power.

Evolution in British Africa

By COLIN LEYS

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OF THE COLONIAL POWERS in Africa, Britain alone made the preparation of her colonies for self-rule into a major policy principle. It is therefore ironic that Britain now shares world headlines with Portugal as an imperial power still controlling some of the largest and most troubled areas of the continent. This is partly due to the fact that Britain has refused herself the luxury of any "midnight flit" such as Belgium allowed in the Congo. But it is also due to a deep flaw in her colonial policy where British settlers are concerned.

It was hard to see a coherent theme running through Britain's policy in East and Central Africa during the first half of 1961, unless it was one of simple expediency. Britain clearly desired to shed her responsibilities in the area. But which racial community did she favor? Only in the last weeks of June did it become clear that Kenya would be allowed to work out a political future undistracted by last-ditch British support for the special position of the European minority there. On the other hand, in Northern Rhodesia, in what the Northern Rhodesian lib-

eral European leader Sir John Moffat called an act of "imbecility," the British government backtracked on its own plan for accepting an African majority in the legislature. This re-opened the era of racial conflict which most people, including Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, thought was finally closed. It seemed that in East Africa, it had been decided that African power was no longer resistible. In Central Africa, however, Sir Roy Welensky offered an alternative which the British government was tempted to prefer.

At the beginning of the year only two territories, Nyasaland and Tanganyika, showed in their constitutions that the path to majority rule was clear, and that there was some promise that they could deal with the problems that self-rule would create. Both stand at the watershed between black Africa and the white-dominated bloc of states in Southern Africa. Both are relatively homogeneous; with inconsiderable white communities, with tribal systems weakened by slave wars and an early dose of direct rule, and with peoples unified today by religion (in Nyasaland) and a common language (Tanganyika).

Nyasaland

By mid-1961 Nyasaland was engaged in its first truly national election campaign; its franchise assured an African majority in the Legislative Council, and even held out the possibility of an African majority in the Executive Council. Hastings Banda's Malawi Congress party (Malawi is the name of a legendary kingdom of the area) seemed to have no serious opposition among the Afri-

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can population. The interesting questions no longer concerned the struggle for emancipation. Instead they concerned the problem of how the M.C.P. would tackle Nyasaland's poverty. One thing seemed clear: there would be no further help from Northern Rhodesian copper revenues because it was taken for granted in the M.C.P. that Nyasaland would leave the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which made this aid possible. The precise way in which this break would occur remained undecided.

The budgetary adjustment for Nyasaland is probably in the region of £2 million per annum. Therefore it may well seem prudent to defer the rupture until the last possible moment. This might be done by an administrative device. Many federal departments still use the old Nyasaland government departments as their agents in Nyasaland, and have not set up their own offices there. It might prove astute gradually to make these departments into agents of the new Nyasaland government, without formally saying so. The day of reckoning with the federal treasury might thus be postponed. Certainly it was noticeable during the election campaign that the issue of secession from Federation was being handled with some discretion.

What is clear is that Nyasaland will have a hard time finding the finances to make headway against the stark fact of the country's lack of minerals, relatively high population density and lack of communications and coastline.

The key figure, in dealing with these problems, is probably Dunduzu Chisisa, the Secretary General of the M.C.P. and one of Banda's closest colleagues. If Chisisa's short book, *"Africa—What Lies Ahead"*, is any guide, he is one of the most far-sighted current leaders. He has made a wide study of the economics of development. Interestingly enough, one of the book's two chapters is a penetrating discussion of the role of religion in the new Africa. There is also evidence in his discussion of other problems that Christianity in Nyasaland may be as powerful an influence on the pattern of self-government as it was on the struggle to attain self-government.

One lesson was painfully learned in Central Africa in 1961: no governmental struc-

ture can long contain subordinate parts of completely different political characters. The 1960 Review Conference on the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been adjourned pending the outcome of internal developments in all three of the constituent territories. Nyasaland, it was already clear, was rapidly moving toward *de facto* secession, because of the imminent election and virtually certain victory of the Malawi Congress party.

Interest centered on the two Rhodesias. In February it seemed that Britain would impose a constitution on Northern Rhodesia. Though far from fully democratic, this would in effect have given genuine representatives of the Africans a narrow majority in the legislature. The plain fact finally came into the open that the continuance of federation depended on the maintenance of white control in Northern Rhodesia.

The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky, announced his and his United Federal party's rejection of this constitution. The five (European) United Federal party members of the Northern Rhodesian government resigned. The federal government, which controls the defense forces of the Federation, called up the all-white "territorial" battalions as a "precautionary measure" against possible disorder. Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence party, the largest African organization in Northern Rhodesia, was soon persuaded to support the proposed constitution. Thus the call-up seemed calculated to impress the British government of the reality of the federal government's power on the spot. The British government was also subjected to great pressure from its right wing backbenchers, already incensed at the Colonial Secretary's policies in Kenya.

These demonstrations had their effect. After first conceding "further discussions" in Northern Rhodesia under the chairmanship of the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, the British government finally accepted a revision of its own scheme. This seemed certain to ensure that the U.N.I.P. would *not* control a majority in the legislature. Whether the U.F.P. would be enabled to retain its own hold on power was less clear. It was one of the most complicated and (in the eyes of most observers) one of the most

crudely rigged constitutions ever devised. Sir Roy Welensky seemed to think that with the help of well-to-do African voters his party's hold over Northern Rhodesia might be maintained; and on this basis the Federation might be continued.

Whether it would be a real federation, however, and whether it could continue long on this basis remains open to question. Assuming that Nyasaland leaves the federation, it will then consist of only the two Rhodesias, held together by the unity of their white minorities, with a white-controlled central government. Sir Roy Welensky seems likely to wish to defer a final settlement of the federal constitution until after the Northern Rhodesian elections due to be held under the new scheme, that is, until early 1962. It seems very possible that by then other forces, not least the now embittered nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia, may have carried events to a different conclusion. When the new scheme was announced after several tense weeks of pressure politics, Kaunda declared it a betrayal and forecast unlimited political and economic warfare.

Southern Rhodesia

Southern Rhodesia also announced in June, 1961, a new constitution, which was due to be submitted to a referendum at the end of July. This constitution may be read in two ways. One way shows a liberalizing of the territory's antique system of racial discrimination and exclusion of Africans from political power. This would make it much less difficult for Britain to sign away its remaining controls over the federal government at the resumed Review Conference. Another way reveals a pattern of political life laid down as Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead's permanent answer to the question, what part is the African to play in public life in Southern Rhodesia—federated or not?

The new constitution is the outcome of a separate series of discussions begun in London in December, 1960, and continued in Salisbury in February, 1961, under the chairmanship of Duncan Sandys, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Joshua Nkomo's National Democratic party, representing the vast majority of Southern

Rhodesian Africans, was represented at the first two parts of these talks; and publicly agreed to the main elements of the constitutional proposals which emerged from them. Later this agreement was repudiated, when Sir Edgar refused to make further concessions on land policy which the N.D.P. leaders claimed to have been a condition of their initial agreement.

The constitution provides that about a quarter of the legislature will be Africans (who seem likely to be genuine representatives of African opinion). At the same time, subject to a Declaration of Rights being entrenched in the Constitution, Britain will abandon her formal powers of veto over certain kinds of Southern Rhodesian legislation. The government will then be fully autonomous in internal affairs. Africans will have a choice in the legislature, but neither power to control it nor power to prevent constitutional revision of most parts of the constitution. For this, they would need to control over a third, not a quarter of the legislature. This situation is, according to the campaign speeches of both Sir Edgar and Sir Roy, intended to last for a long time; while the country is industrialized, while Africans are integrated into the urban economy, and while a peasant farming community of Africans with individual titles gradually replaces the tribal confusion of land-use in the reserves. Some attempt even seems to be contemplated to restore to the chiefs their long-vanished authority in rural areas. (In the field of urban housing and in industrial relations Sir Edgar has indeed been taking steps to remove legal barriers to integration; it remains only to see whether the necessary initiatives in training and overcoming other forms of barrier will also be taken by the government, to make this highly constructive part of the over-all plan into a reality.)

Apart from its possible influence on the British government's attitude towards federation, the most important question to ask about this general scheme is whether it offers a basis for peaceful development and ultimate majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, let alone in continued association with Northern Rhodesia. It is hard to answer this question hopefully. As a permanent solution, a quarter of the legislature no longer seems

enough to Southern Rhodesian Africans in 1961. The plan which white voters are being asked to accept as not too far-reaching has already been repudiated by the African majority. Nor will the policy of rural settlement work so long as there is no radical reallocation of land in favor of Africans. Yet a positive change of this kind is one which Sir Edgar had not found it safe to propose in the steadily hardening climate of white opinion south of the Zambesi.

Meantime rural overcrowding and urban unemployment are feeding the new note of uncompromising nationalism which has begun to be heard in Southern Rhodesia. To this basic rejection of his ideas by the African majority Sir Edgar has, however, seemingly only one answer—his careful and now complete build-up of the instruments of force. It would be difficult to predict for Southern Rhodesia, as for Northern Rhodesia, anything but a tense and troubled future until fresh vision is brought to bear on its fundamental human problems.

Tanganyika

Tanganyika lacks the religious homogeneity of Nyasaland. With its vast sprawling territory, sparsely occupied even with nearly nine million inhabitants, it presents a development problem even more complex and interminable. Unlike Nyasaland, however, Tanganyika has not had to divert energies to resisting the political pretensions of immigrant minorities. As a mandated territory, it was protected from large-scale white immigration between the wars. Today perhaps 3,000–4,000 out of a total white population of 20,000 are settlers, in the sense that they wish to retire and end their days in the country. Moreover, these settlers are extremely mixed, including substantial proportions of Germans, Greeks and Swiss, in addition to British.

No united English farming community grew up near the capital with serious ambitions for political control, as was the case in Kenya. A more serious challenge might have come from the territory's Asian community, now nearly 100,000 strong. But under far-sighted leadership it threw its influence behind the nationalist movement when the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) was organized in 1954. As a

result Julius Nyerere's government today includes two Asians, besides two Europeans.

The transition to full internal self-government on May 1, 1961, to be followed by complete independence on December 9, has been smooth and cordial. On May 1, the Governor withdrew from meetings of the Cabinet; Nyerere was restyled Prime Minister instead of Chief Minister; the post of Deputy Governor (mainly responsible for the civil service hitherto) was abolished; and the last nominated Ministers resigned. Tanganyika faced independence with a Cabinet drawn entirely from the Assembly, and one which was on the whole impressive.

The immediate problems of self-rule were mainly and predictably matters of personnel. Under generous compensation terms it was hoped to retain a large part of the country's 1,700 senior expatriate officials long enough to be able to replace them with qualified local people. By mid-July, 20 per cent—a tolerable proportion—had given notice that they would take their compensation and go. Nonetheless, an alarming possibility remained that the remainder might yet decide to leave too soon. Tanganyika in 1960 had in all 84 African school students potentially qualified for university training at British universities or at the new East African University. Others might find further education elsewhere. But to staff the executive levels of both public and private administration in a country of nine million people, this trickle is woefully small. In the three-year development plan for 1961–1964, education is the largest single expenditure item. Ultimately the gap will doubtless be closed as the remaining expatriates gradually decide to leave. But there will be a critical interlude.

Contemplating this prospect and the problem of re-directing their political organization now that its basic objective of self-rule has been fulfilled, the top leaders of Tanganyika might be excused for being nervous. It is an open secret that T.A.N.U. subscriptions have been sagging, and a new role is needed for this dynamic organization, in its day probably the most efficient in East or Central Africa. It seems likely that this problem, coupled with potential administrative weakness, is behind the "tough" line which the government has threatened to take in ban-

ning meetings of the insignificant opposition party, the African National Congress. This organization impresses only by its extreme tone and its willingness to accept support from Communist countries. There is no evidence that it has a popular following, nor does T.A.N.U. seem likely to develop any permanently authoritarian tendencies on the basis of present evidence.

Independence for Tanganyika did bring to a head another problem which has been looming over East Africa for some years and which has had important repercussions outside Tanganyika, especially in Kenya. The East African High Commission, created in 1948, has operated a large network of services on behalf of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda—from the collection of taxes to the operation of posts and railways. Its continued existence was naturally called into question when Tanganyika went forward alone towards independence. Prime Minister Nyerere had long seen that Britain's desire to retain the High Commission might induce her to accelerate independence in Kenya and Uganda so that this crisis might be avoided. Then the Commission might be "re-adopted" by the three independent states. Having failed to achieve this, Nyerere now sought to conduct a "holding action" which might still contribute to this goal; and he had a very large measure of success.

Common Services Authority

A conference was held in London at the end of June, attended by government and opposition leaders from all three territories, and by the Colonial Secretary and his advisers. The theoretical problem before it was: how could an independent Tanganyika and two dependent territories exercise joint political control over the High Commission without any derogation of Tanganyika's full independence? The old High Commission consisted of the three territorial Governors; Nyerere could not now take Tanganyika's place in that company, in which he could be outvoted by two of Britain's leading colonial administrators. A political solution was found. The Commission will be replaced by an East African Common Services Authority.

Control will be exercised by a "troika" of the "principal elected Ministers" from each

territory. There will be an enlarged legislature for the new Authority, also drawn from the elected members of the territorial legislatures. In return for Tanganyika's not demanding the full attributes of sovereignty the other two territories, in practice, receive a substantial installment of political self-rule. Thus, the powers which their "principal elected Ministers"—in practice, their leading African politicians—will exercise are considerable.

The stake was large—the possibility of a federal union—and to win it, the British government finally recognized, in effect, that Jomo Kenyatta would have to be released. Here we reach the single most important development to flow from the new Common Services Authority agreement, perhaps the most important development in East Africa for several years.

Kenya and Jomo Kenyatta

Jomo Kenyatta has long been accepted by Kenya Africans and by Africans elsewhere in East Africa as the rightful leader of Kenya. Most Kenyan Europeans, including the present Kenya government's senior European advisers, feel equally strongly that Kenyatta, the convicted "manager" of Mau Mau, is an embodiment of evil. Without Kenyatta, African self-rule in Kenya would be hollow and almost certainly factious and unconstructive. Powerful European opposition had effectively barred his release from detention and re-entry into politics.

The Lancaster House constitution of February, 1960, broke this deadlock to the extent of permitting an African-controlled legislature. In the general belief that progress was being resumed, the significance of Kenyatta tended to be overlooked. But when the first elections were held under this constitution, in February, 1961, Kenyatta immediately became front page news again. Without him, African opinion was hopelessly divided. Thanks to uneven districting, a party deadlock resulted from the poll. The Kenya African National Union, the party of the Luo and Kikuyu, the two largest and most progressive tribes, received over half the votes but only just over one-third of the seats. The Kenya African Democratic Union, a defensive grouping of weaker rural tribes, gained one-sixth of

the votes but nearly one-quarter of the seats. According to normal usage, K.A.N.U. should have formed a government, seeking to make an alliance with members of the legislature who belonged to neither party. But the only serious issue of the election had been Kenyatta's release. Both parties, especially K.A.N.U., had made this their main election plank; and after the poll neither wished to seem less determined than the other in pressing the point home.

At that moment the Governor, Sir Patrick Renison, made a singularly inept statement foreshadowing the indefinite continuance of Kenyatta's detention. K.A.N.U. refused to form a government, and the only possible stable basis for a spell of political evolution without Kenyatta disappeared. K.A.D.U. hesitated. But the temptation was very great, and finally Ngala, its leader, agreed to form a government composed of 14 K.A.D.U. members and 16 non-K.A.D.U. (and largely indirectly elected or nominated) members. K.A.D.U. argued publicly that this was a more effective way to get Kenyatta released than to prolong a governmental crisis.

It is impossible to say whether the British government hoped by keeping K.A.D.U. in office to avoid releasing Kenyatta indefinitely. It seems clear that Britain hoped to be able to sustain Ngala with subsidies. The relatively vast sum of £13.5 million was promptly granted after a visit to London in April by the K.A.D.U. leaders, at a time when they themselves were still painfully vague as to the economic purposes for which such funds were needed. Whatever the truth was then, however, the situation changed completely when discussions on the Common Services Authority took place. Two things became immediately clear: first, in the long run Kenya's "principal elected minister" could not be so unrepresentative as Ngala; the way must be cleared for a fresh constitution and more representative government in Kenya if the new Authority was to work. Second, the agreement of the Kenya delegates to the conference, including both K.A.D.U. and K.A.N.U. leaders, was due to one fact alone, i.e., Kenyatta had called them together beforehand and told them to agree. From his still private posi-

tion under restriction in Kenya's remote countryside, Kenyatta alone had the power to unite Kenyan leaders of all parties.

The reaction of the British government was at last prompt and realistic. Within a matter of weeks, Kenyatta's release was announced (for July 28) and his re-entry into politics seemed assured. For the moment, the most unfortunate feature of the new policy was that Kenyatta's release was being granted to a minority party when it had been refused to one with an electoral majority. Until a more representative electoral system was introduced and elections were held, Kenyatta himself would face keen difficulties in bringing Kenya peacefully into the era of majority rule.

It was noticeable that European reactions were by now mainly resigned; for good or evil Kenyatta was a force in Kenya with which the European community would have to come to terms. Kenyatta's views on the most contentious issue, land titles in the white highlands, were still known only imprecisely; and the reappearance of oath-taking ceremonies, reminiscent of the Mau Mau era, was also giving much cause for fear. Both in the white highlands, and in the "consolidated" African farming areas where individual titles have been created over the past five years, changes are surely going to occur. There are signs that Kenyatta realizes that these changes must be made in a way that will retain the confidence of all the farmers of Kenya who provide its all-important agricultural surplus. The problem is still going to call for all the restraint and discipline which he can impose.

Uganda

The prospect of an independent Kenya also had its repercussions in Uganda. There, the integrity of the country is still at stake as a result of the Buganda traditionalists' refusal to endorse any moves toward independence except those that would recognize the separate independence of Buganda. In March, 1961, elections were held for a newly constituted Uganda legislative council, almost 90 per cent of which was directly elected. Moreover, a majority in the new council of ministers would be drawn from the majority party in the legis-

lature. The purpose of this election was to try to induce Buganda to enter the democratic machinery of a united Uganda. Otherwise, the new Uganda government would obviously be dominated by the non-Buganda peoples. Buganda would find itself in danger of crude subordination at the hands of the central Uganda government, which would no longer be restrained by a majority of the colonial government's nominees.

On the other hand, if they participated, the Buganda politicians would have to ally themselves with more democratically-minded party leaders outside Buganda. This was what the British plainly hoped that the Baganda would be tempted or frightened into doing. But Buganda pride and traditionalism proved too strong. The only Baganda to register for the vote were a small minority of mainly Catholic voters, not so much discontented with Buganda separatism as with the Protestantism of the current rulers of Buganda. The result was that no real contest took place in Buganda; and 20 out of its 21 seats in the Uganda legislature went to the Catholic-based Democratic party. Elsewhere in the territory the D. P. was beaten 7 to 5 by the Uganda Peoples Congress. As a result the D. P. gained a bare majority of seats in the new legislature and its leader, the Buganda Catholic lawyer Benedict Kiwanuka, became Leader of Government Business and, in July, Chief Minister.

This election was hardly a success. Outside Buganda the U.P.C. naturally felt frustrated and bitter. East Africa got its second minority government in two months. Worse, the D.P.'s religious basis means that although it is fairly conservative in outlook, no rapprochement with Buganda's present leadership seems possible. Buganda, the wealthy heartland, is vital to Uganda. The only hope therefore lies in finding a compromise constitutional formula for preserving Uganda's unity while catering to Buganda's deep-seated desire for separate institutions and the supremacy of her Kabakaship.

The search for a compromise was entrusted to a three-man visiting commission from the United Kingdom under the chairmanship of Lord Munster. Reporting in June, it noted that Bugandan leaders re-

fused even to meet the Commission while it was in the country. The report proposed that Buganda should be kept in Uganda by means of a special federal relationship, which would not apply to other areas of the country. The Buganda parliament, the Lukiko, would have autonomous powers with respect to the Kabakaship, the Lukiko and other traditional institutions. The price would be direct elections for the Lukiko (leading, it is hoped, to Buganda's increasing integration in Uganda politics through the development of party organization in Buganda); the withdrawal of the Kabaka into constitutional monarchy; and an absolute obligation on Buganda's part to send representatives to the central Uganda legislature.

Buganda's immediate reaction to these proposals was one of apparent indifference. So far Bugandan leaders seem to feel no pressure to abandon their point-blank policy of non-cooperation. The nub of the Munster proposal lies, of course, in the division of powers between Uganda and Buganda. The powers cited above which Buganda would exercise exclusively would be the only ones of this kind; all other powers would either belong exclusively to the central government, or to both governments concurrently, with the center prevailing in case of a conflict of laws on any subject.

Consequently the question comes back again to politics. How would this immense dual jurisdiction be amicably shared in practice? It would seem to call for rare understanding between the two levels of government, not the rare hostility that exists at present. As so often in politics, a durable solution must probably wait for a fundamental shift towards greater democracy in Buganda itself, and hard bargaining between new elements there and leaders outside Buganda. It is possible that outside pressures, such as other East African leaders' common determination to avoid any repetition of the Congo crisis, Nyerere's desire for federation, or Kenyatta's potential status as a pan-East African leader, may help drive Buganda towards the rest of Uganda. In July, however, few encouraging signs were visible that the further Entebbe talks on Uganda's constitutional future would lead to a constructive solution.

Conclusion

To conclude this survey a postscript cannot be avoided. While the British government was groping towards the "exit" door on East Africa's mainland, violence suddenly flared on the half-forgotten, romantic clove-island of Zanzibar off the coast of Tanganyika. Zanzibar received her first fully democratic constitution in 1960. In June, 1961, within a few days, she earned the sobriquet of "the Cuba of East Africa." If true this would certainly add an appalling complication to East Africa's already over-complex problems.

It is impossible to write confidently about the significance of the June riots. Although they began during the polling in the second closely contested election in five months (one held in January resulted in a party deadlock) the parties were not primarily racially divided. Yet the riots were strongly racial in character. Coastal Africans widely trace their descent to mixed marriages with early Persian immigrants from the Iranian town of Shiraz. The Afro-Shirazi party does have an African leadership and the Zanzibar Nationalist party has an Arab leadership. Arabs form only 17 per cent of the population, yet the Z.N.P. won a narrow majority in the election. It follows that the main cleavage between the party ranks and files runs right through the African population, most of which backs the Arab leaders of the Z.N.P.

The parties do not cover all the population, however. Many Zanzibar Africans immigrated from Tanganyika and few of these have voting rights in the island. (The A.S.P. received at least moral support from T.A.N.U.). Certainly, when order was finally restored by mainland troops, the greater

part of the victims were seen to have been Arabs.

By this time, however, a coalition government consisting of the Z.N.P. and the small Pemba Peoples party had been formed. The main Z.N.P. leaders pointedly took the least provocative portfolios, and promised a shocked and confused populace a full inquiry.

At this time, no revolutionary changes seem imminent or even likely. The comparison with Cuba springs solely from the fact that some Z.N.P. leaders, and particularly the Secretary, Abdul Mohammed, have become more or less closely associated with Peking. Mohammed publishes, ostensibly independently but from his party's building, a daily news-sheet financed and largely written by a Peking propaganda agency. Among its Communist-angled news items, the Z.N.P. leader Ali Muhsin's verbatim speeches sometimes also appear. The origins of this Communist connection seem to lie in the natural leanings towards Cairo and the Arab bloc which are felt by most of the Z.N.P. leaders, although their Communist sympathies do not appear to be more than skin deep at present. On the other hand the Z.N.P.'s popular following undoubtedly rests partly on the party's anti-Americanism (symbolized by verbal attacks on the U.S. satellite-tracking base on the island) as well as on lavishly impossible economic promises.

But the fact remains that there has been no revolution. In retrospect the riots are more reminiscent of a Casbah bloodletting than of a politically-inspired prelude to a *coup d'état*. If Zanzibar is to be a real Cuba of East Africa, the Z.N.P., and Zanzibar herself, have many drastic evolutionary stages ahead.

"... An attitude of militant nationalism characterizes the posture of nearly all the new independent governments. This is understandable because it is characteristic of states that have just exchanged a colonial status for one of legal equality with the oldest and greatest powers of the world. They lean toward neutralism vis-a-vis both the United States and the U.S.S.R. for precisely the same reasons that the United States when young asserted its neutrality with respect to the power politics of Western Europe. Through neutralism, they hope to avoid the risk of involvement in any conflict, an involvement that might spell catastrophe to all their hopes for the future."—Grayson Kirk, to the 57th General Meeting of the American Association of University Women, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1961.

"... The governments of Angola, Mozambique, the Central African Federation and South Africa," Colin Lovell writes, "are all 'white man's' governments." He cautions that these "'white' governments in the sub-Saharan region have a natural community of interest" which may someday take shape as "an organization to counterbalance 'black Africa' north of them."

Winds of Change in Southern Africa

By COLIN RHYS LOVELL

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PRIME MINISTER Harold Macmillan of Great Britain must occasionally reflect ruefully on the prescience of his metaphor to a stonily hostile South African Parliament in 1959—"winds of change" sweeping over Africa. That Parliament is now the legislature for a republic outside the Commonwealth; the Central African Federation totters; and Britain's oldest ally, Portugal, pours troops into a bloody revolt in Angola and keeps Mozambique only in uneasy calm.

A surging Africanism, less positively national than anti-European in aim, has stimulated a counter determination by Europeans in Africa to hold the line. The determination is grimmer because of knowledge by Europeans that in their struggle to maintain their dominance they cannot expect assistance from a Europe which is writing off its chapter in imperialism and giving active encouragement to the new African leadership.

South Africa Departs

The most extreme reaction by Europeans in Africa to events there has come from those in the Republic of South Africa, where they are the largest, longest-settled, economically most advanced of any European group

in the sub-continent. The South African European minority, one-tenth of the 14.6 million Union population, and further divided on a 65-35 Afrikaner-English ratio, has watched uneasily while the Commonwealth since World War II has acquired an Afro-Asian majority. Afrikaner feeling that a republic is "natural" has been strengthened, and the English minority's psychological need for monarchy has been weakened by this change.

The immediate drive for a republic, however, came from the need of Prime Minister Henrik F. Verwoerd to consolidate his uneasy position within the Nationalist party. The Nationalist party's Cape section had opposed his succession to the party leadership after the death of J. C. Strijdom in 1958. Verwoerd also saw that his strong support of apartheid was losing political utility as Nationalists grumbled about its costs. The Golden Jubilee of the Union, 1960, saw the Prime Minister sponsoring legislation for an advisory referendum on a republic by the European electorate in all five provinces (the last a slap at the United Nations and its denial that Southwest Africa was a province of the Union).

A *simple* majority, even of one, declared Verwoerd, would both permit and require the government to introduce the necessary legislation. The bill ignored all the 9.8 million Bantu (whose slight parliamentary representation by Europeans had ceased in 1960); it was also silent about the 1.5 million Colored (mixed), who had a small European parliamentary representation, and the 400,000 Asiatics, whose never-exercised

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communal franchise of 1946 was abolished in 1949. All were less important than that step which Verwoerd felt both necessary and safe.

Republicanism, more than apartheid, had welded Afrikaners behind the Nationalist party in three successively greater parliamentary election victories, beginning with the surprise one of 1948. But party leaders had been coy about, and carefully avoided, the actual achievement of a republic. Both Malan and Strijdom had insisted that a republic could come only as a result of a special majority in a referendum, probably two-thirds. In view of the Nationalists' inability to win a majority of popular votes, Malan and Strijdom thus effectively shelved the republic.

The Verwoerd policy of 1960 made republicanism immediate practical politics and carried the crucial assumption that this core Nationalist principle would win a popular majority. Government calculations required the exclusion of Colored voters from the referendum and included the 133,000 additional European voters produced by the reduction in the European voting age in 1959 from 21 to 18. In this group the Afrikaner-English ratio was 70-30; and the Afrikaners were the products of the separate Afrikaner-English educational systems, established by the Nationalists in 1949, and whose Afrikaner side emphasized "ware Afrikanerism."

By the time the referendum measure became law, the Congo upheavals echoed in the Union to mar its jubilee celebrations. The most serious racial disturbances in Union history began in March with a typical passbook riot at Sharpeville in the Transvaal. But also involved was a bid by the radical, anti-European splinter Pan-African Congress of Robert Sobukwe for Bantu loyalties and its challenge to its parent organization, the African National Congress. Inexperienced police lost their heads, and there was shooting and then riots. Large police reinforcements quieted Sharpeville, only to have the distant Cape Town area, which had never known racial trouble, flare. The timing of the Cape Town riots indicated a good underground organization. Europeans were further jolted when the Colored, hitherto identifying themselves with the European

community, joined the Bantu rioters in the Cape Town region.

The government met the threat with martial law for the entire country from March to the end of August, 1960. During this time from 10,000 to 20,000 persons were "detained," (the lower figure the official one, the higher that of foreign correspondents, who labored under severe censorship and police surveillance). Criticism of Verwoerd from South African Bureau of Racial Affairs intellectuals and Cape Nationalists, who continued a muted echo of the old Cape liberal tradition, nearly cost him his office. The Nationalist dissidents urged modification of pass laws and gradual assimilation of Coloreds into the European group for political purposes, the latter the hope of the one-time Nationalist Prime Minister, General J. B. M. Hertzog.

The attempt on Verwoerd's life, for reasons unconnected with racial policy, by David Pratt, a Transvaal English farmer (subsequently declared mentally unfit for trial and committed to a mental institution), afforded this inner Nationalist group an opportunity to make gains with its program under the leadership of Paul Sauer of the cabinet. However, the moderates were rebuffed by the voters of Parrow, a center of the Cape disturbances; there, a Nationalist, who stood on the Verwoerd "granite wall" policy of no compromise, was re-elected with a greatly increased majority in a parliamentary by-election. By the time Verwoerd returned to public affairs, the Cape moderates had retired, abashed.

The racial troubles and the subsequent trials including that of Sobukwe, who received three years, overshadowed the jubilee and the referendum campaign which does not appear to have been affected by either the Congo violence or the limitations of martial law. Nationalists argued that a republic would not change anything since South Africa was already completely independent. The Opposition, if for different reasons, agreed, but added that a republic of South Africa would be outside the Commonwealth.

By the close of the campaign Commonwealth had become the issue. Significantly, in terms of the mood of their supporters, Nationalist leaders gave assurances that a republic would remain within the Common

wealth and recalled that it had been Malan who had worked out the scheme in 1949 whereby the Republic of India had stayed in the Club. The Opposition retorted that the requirement of approval by all Commonwealth members for new additions (as South Africa would be as a republic) and Afro-Asian hostility toward South African racial policy foreclosed any such possibility.

The effects of these arguments upon the 1.8 million European voters, 90 per cent of whom went to the polls on October 5, 1960, are problematical. The results, however, gave Nationalist leaders pause. The republic won a majority of 52 per cent, the first Nationalist popular majority (although the Colored vote did not operate); but this figure did not reflect the Union's 65-35 Afrikaner-English ratio. As expected, solidly English Natal gave a large majority against a republic; but the Cape Province, without a republican tradition, went for a republic by the smallest of margins, 50.1 per cent, despite the 60-40 Afrikaner-English ratio in that province.

Had the Coloreds voted, the republic would have lost in the Cape. The former Transvaal and Orange Free State republics provided larger republican majorities, but still below the Afrikaner level in these two provinces. Only in Southwest Africa, with its large German element (much of it once pro-Nazi) did the republican majority go over the idealized two-thirds mark. Individual district returns indicated that Afrikaners in urban and suburban districts who returned Nationalists to Parliament had voted against a republic. Only the solid republican rural Afrikaner vote had given the republic its narrow victory on the all-Union level.

The referendum results made the government press more seriously for Commonwealth membership than some of the immediate coterie of Verwoerd had probably originally intended. Ministers anticipated Afro-Asian hostility, but also anticipated that the British government, particularly Macmillan, would work out a *modus vivendi* at the Prime Ministers Conference in March, 1961. These plans went awry when Afro-Asian demands that a republic of South Africa modify its racial policies before admission to the

Commonwealth received the support of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of Canada (with the public approval of the Leader of the Liberal Opposition, Lester Pearson). Verwoerd recognized that this stand by the premier dominion precluded any British mediation and on March 15, 1961, withdrew the South African application.

The knowledge that their republic would be outside the Commonwealth momentarily jolted most South African Europeans. On his return from London Verwoerd emphasized the hostility of Afro-Asian members, praised the efforts of Macmillan, but did not mention the decisive stand by Diefenbaker. This official version of the conference kept the bill for a republic moving through Parliament.

Contrary to English fears and charges, the republican constitution was not the notorious Draft Constitution of 1942, which Verwoerd had then signed and which had indicated only bare tolerance for the English minority. Instead, the law for the republic merely substituted a titular president, elected by a joint session of Parliament, for the Queen. All else remained the same. Governor-General Charles R. Swart was duly elected president by a party vote and took office on Union Day, May 31, 1961, in the midst of general indifference, except for an unsuccessful Bantu protest strike.

The exit of South Africa from the Commonwealth is not a happy augury for that peculiar grouping of states, whose 1914 core has now been breached. Australians and New Zealanders are especially concerned about the future of the Commonwealth, and general thinking is well-summed up in the phrase, "A Leaf Falls" (*Round Table*, June, 1961). South African membership in the sterling bloc is unaffected, but whether it will retain its tariff arrangements with Great Britain is doubtful. While defense agreements with the United Kingdom will continue, its diplomatic service will no longer be available to South Africa, which will, therefore, have to enlarge its foreign service.

Inevitably, cultural contacts will weaken. This has merit for some Nationalist zealots, who look almost with favor upon a trek by some English intellectuals and professional people to Canada, Australia, and New Zea-

land. But the party leadership is in the position of having won all its victories and being left without any unifying issue, even that of the Commonwealth. As Malan and Strijdom knew in announcing the unattainable two-thirds figure, republicanism covered personal and sectional Nationalist cleavages. What principle now will unite the party? Verwoerd indirectly recognized his possible future problems when shortly after the referendum he urged the English to continue their separate parties. The English, however, no longer need rally behind the United Party, which equally has avoided the real issue of South African racial policy by its appeals to "Commonwealth loyalty."

Both major parties are left with the probability of some major realignments in which neither present leadership may survive intact. The defection of Japie Basson from the Nationalists and that of the Progressives led by Dr. Jan Steytler from the United party become more important than when they occurred in 1959. However, party shifts will be within the broad framework of traditional South African racial mores.

The Bantu have demonstrated their inability to challenge, at least successfully, the supremacy of Europeans, who have shown their willingness to use what force is needed to maintain power. The sudden termination of the mass treason trials after three years on March 29, 1961, with a unanimous judicial verdict of not guilty for the remaining 28 defendants merely produced the European reaction that the law must be changed. External criticism, especially by the U.N., of official South African racial policy, gains that policy general South African European approval. U.N. efforts to send observers to Southwest Africa were thwarted by government air patrols in June, 1961. There is speculation that South Africa may leave the United Nations, but most Europeans in the Union will not care. The English may regret the loss of Commonwealth, but its increasingly non-European character has made the loss easier to bear. Both English and Afrikaners agree that they will make no concessions in racial policy and will resist any threat.

The Uneasy Central African Federation

In 1953, the British government launched

the Central African Federation as a counterpoise to the Union of South Africa to prove that racial "partnership" was superior to "apartheid." Seven years later the Federation has become a British nightmare. African leaders have come to realize that "partnership" is but a subtle version of "apartheid." The European minority, one-thirtieth of the total population of seven million, had hoped for full dominion status in 1960, the year of constitutional revision, so as to be free from limitations on racial policy. By that year African experience with the Federation had produced demands by African intellectuals for its outright dissolution. In the middle an unhappy British government tried to placate both sides with little success.

Unlike the situation in South Africa, the Federation has African political parties. These are little more than personal followings, but they enjoy mass African support and also foreign funds, some from within Africa, but also some from behind the Iron Curtain. This latter supply may cease, however, in view of Soviet experience in the Congo. The protectorate status of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia has given African parties a direct entrée to the British government, which has been somewhat amenable to their pressure. The ability of the British government to veto racially discriminatory Southern Rhodesian legislation allows a similar British control over that otherwise self-governing portion of the Federation. The federal government, obviously on trial, has been unable to move in the most crucial area of race relations. African leaders have pointed out, however, that the federal franchise is loaded for white supremacy.

The year of constitutional revision, 1960, saw the Congo violence likewise echoing in the Federation, whose Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia runs into the Congo's Katanga Province. Violence rocked all three portions of the Federation. The only glimmer of racial cooperation appeared in the agreement between the African and European unions in Northern Rhodesia for a gradual relaxation of the industrial color bar so that in time Africans would be eligible for any skilled work, if otherwise qualified. Elsewhere in Northern Rhodesia extra drafts of police kept an uneasy order.


Nyasaland Africans are the most dissatisfied with the whole Federation plan. Organized into the Malawi party led by Dr. Hastings Banda, they rioted to demand secession from the Federation and full equality for the territory's 2.7 million Africans, 11,000 Asiatics, and 8,000 Europeans instead of continued dominance in local government by the last group. A combination of good sense by Banda and the local authorities restored some kind of order.

The Southern Rhodesian troubles resembled those of the Union. Disorder, with centers at Salisbury and Bulawayo, aimed at relaxation of pass laws, then of land allocation, and finally of control of government by Europeans, 10 per cent of the total territorial population, but nevertheless, the largest group of Europeans in any of the three component parts of the Federation. Premier Sir Edgar Whitehead reacted as did Verwoerd in the Union. Behind the principle of colonial self-government Sir Edgar invoked martial law, had severe legislation passed, and deported Joshua Nkomo of the National Democratic party.

The severity of Southern Rhodesian policy caused Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold to resign in protest against the inability, or unwillingness, of the federal government to intervene. Garfield Todd, leader of the multi-racial Central African party, blew it wide open when he demanded that the British government suspend the Southern Rhodesian constitution and send in British troops to protect Africans.

Against this background the Monckton Commission tried to get information about the next step for the Federation. By the time it reported in late 1960 it had ceased to think about dominion status for the Federation and was instead recommending devolution of central government powers to the constituent parts. This was indicated in the recommendation by the commission for a revision of the local franchises, and here the report made strong hints about the Southern Rhodesian franchise which permitted a small minority of Europeans to control 96 per cent of the local legislature's seats. Almost underlining the commission's intent for the Federation's central government was its relative silence about the similar

DIVISIONS OF AFRICA BY CARDINAL DIRECTION



Department of State Publication 7129, January, 1961

results there of the federal franchise. Commission intentions became almost open in its recommendation that so hateful was Federation to Africans that the very name should be dropped and another substituted; and two African members of the commission in a minority report urged its immediate dissolution.

For African leaders the Monckton report and the riots have indicated that it is the British and not the federal government which count. The most successful venture with Whitehall has been that by Banda, whose threats of secession have produced a new constitution—drafted in London—for Nyasaland. An enlarged Legislative Council will be so elected that the Malawi party will have effective control of it, and with it, the territorial government, in 1961.

Northern Rhodesian Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the United National Independence party, has done nearly as well. Under a plan of 1958, the existing territorial legislature has 8 elected Africans to the 14 chosen by the small European group, although interestingly, and hopefully, two of each group were actually elected by the votes of the other. Like Banda, Kaunda has pressed the

British government for a greater Africanization of the legislature and the government. Unlike its willingness to give much in Nyasaland, however, the British government has had to consider the presence in Northern Rhodesia of the European managerial-technical group. A draft plan in May, 1961, envisaged a Legislative Council of 45 members, a third elected by voters on an "upper roll" (largely European), a third named by people on a "lower roll" (entirely African), and the final third to be elected by voters on both rolls. Local European opinion has been outraged, Kaunda was outraged, and Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the federal government, was also outraged. British officials have thus succeeded in pleasing no one and must continue to work on the Gordian knot.

Southern Rhodesia has yielded to imperial pressure to the extent that Premier Whitehead has consented to the return of Nkomo and to participate in a conference with him and other African and European leaders under the chairmanship of Duncan Sandys, British Minister for Commonwealth Relations. The conference at Salisbury produced a disjointed compromise. Modifications in the franchise law would permit greater African participation in local government. In return for this concession, Europeans received a promise that a local Constitutional Council would replace the British veto over a racially-discriminatory legislature. However, the local selection of the Council and its mere advisory powers make it unsatisfactory to African opinion. So unsatisfactory have Africans viewed the entire compromise that Nkomo has shifted ground to urge his followers to boycott the referendum on the plan. Thus again the British government must solve the insoluble.

In the midst of conferences between local leaders and the British government has stood Sir Roy Welensky of the federal administration, defying the British government to implement the devolution recommendations of the Monckton Commission. Although Sir Roy has unwillingly accepted the constitutional changes in Nyasaland (never a great asset for the Federation), he has been adamant about the proposed changes for Northern Rhodesia. The possibility of similar changes in Southern Rhodesia has increased

his determination to make the federal government count.

In implementing this policy Sir Roy has linked Federation with white supremacy, with the African "junior partner" permanently in that position in the central government. Sir Roy has indicated a "no-nonsense" attitude toward devolution and African rule, and has uttered veiled threats of secession by the Federation from the British Empire if London pressure upon him becomes unbearable. A new status for federal power is indicated by his measure creating a federal army of all European adult males from 18 to 50, so that never again will the federal government lack force. Although Sir Roy in his own conferences in London recognized that dominion status for the Federation would have to be delayed, he has also indicated that the Federation government has a much more immediate concern about the three territorial governments than does Whitehall.

The Welensky policies "prove" the reality of Federation to African leaders, who have been pressing Great Britain to carry through the devolution recommendations of the Monckton Report. Already they are saying that to control a local legislature with few powers is meaningless. Interestingly, Banda, Kaunda, and Nkomo have not yet joined their respective parties into a single one on the federal level to press for drastic modifications in the federal franchise. Congo experience suggests that such a merger of their parties might encounter the obstacles of personal rivalries. Should such a merger occur, the British government would be faced with an even more difficult task. Even as the situation stands, in the words of one harried British M.P., the Central African Federation is "a mess."

The Portuguese Stand

The opera bouffé of the *Santa Maria* in January, 1961, was the prelude to a savage revolt in Angola against Portuguese rule, which as in Mozambique, has depended upon the tolerance of other states. Official Portuguese policy since the sixteenth century has been to "civilize" Africans. Government press releases emphasize that Portugal knows no races, not even keeping census figures by

race, nor any color bar. Instead, the test is "civilization." Never very generous in supplying information about their colonies, the Portuguese have become almost taciturn about them under the Salazar regime.

Behind official statements, lies the long fact of "civilizing" by forced labor, which has denuded vast areas in Angola and has finally produced the present bloody revolution under Holden Roberto. Although all civilized Africans are Portuguese citizens and so immune from forced labor, official policy has so set and administered the tests for civilization that since World War II few Africans have met them. Now the tale of the Congo repeats itself in Angola with terror and counter-terror.

Mozambique has had less forced labor within its borders because of the recruitment of its Africans for the Rand and Welkom mines in South Africa. Conventions between the Union and Mozambique require payment of wages on Portuguese territory and the collection of withholding taxes by Portuguese officials at the mines. The mining companies, the Union, Mozambique—and Lisbon—all have an interest in continuing the current practice, which requires a peaceful Mozambique. Additional troops in the territory keep it quiet, but the calm is uneasy; and rumors are rife about the underground.

The aim of the Angolese rebels and the Mozambique underground is violently anti-European. The Portuguese answer has been force and more troops and statements joining defiance of United Nations disapproval

with determination to defeat the rebels, no matter how expensive or how long it takes. Experience in Algeria, however, suggests that eventually metropolitan governments become unwilling to continue an enormous outlay of men and money to suppress colonial revolts. Salazar must also consider that what Algeria did to the Fourth French Republic, Angola might do to his regime; and Portuguese resources are much less than those of France.

However, the Portuguese may not have to depend on these resources alone. The outcasts of the United Nations, Portugal and South Africa, already have a tacit understanding about arms and the movement of Africans. Furthermore, the governments of Angola, Mozambique, the Central African Federation and South Africa are all "white man's" governments. In addition, they all have a common interest in the flow of African labor to and from the South African mines. If Africans gain control of governments outside of the Union, their programs of local industrialization would seriously disrupt this flow.

Since 1950 Eric Louw, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, has urged that the "white" governments in the sub-Saharan region have a natural community of interest which should have a reflection in some kind of an organization to counterbalance "black Africa" north of them. Although differing on much else, Europeans in these regions might yet erect such a barrier in an attempt to protect themselves against the "winds of change."

"Compared to better known parts of the world, Africa is much larger than we expect it to be. From north to south the continent exceeds 5,000 miles; from east to west it approximates 4,700 miles—distances far in excess of the long span between New York and San Francisco (2,600 miles) or between New York and Paris (3,700 miles). . . .

"One seldom stops to consider, for example, that the continent of North America (including Central America and the Caribbean Islands) is only about four-fifths as large as Africa.

"In the heart of Africa lies a boomerang-shaped strip of territory curving east and south from the Sahara Desert to the Congo Basin, within which all points are more than 1,000 miles from the nearest coast. Thus the very extent of territory in Africa indicates in some measure the potential of future development of physical and human resources."—G. Etzel Percy, "Africa: Names and Concepts," Department of State Bulletin, December 26, 1960.

Discussing the prospect of a new, unified central government for the Congo, this author observes that such a solution is not easily effected. "The Congo has never existed as a single unit in the minds of the Congolese, and there is nothing to make one think that a change will be forthcoming in the near future."

The Congo's First Year of Independence

By ALAN P. MERRIAM

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INDEPENDENCE DAY for the Congo, June 30, 1960, was sunny and cool, the formal ceremonies were ill-attended, and in the evening sparse crowds came to listen to the rock and roll entertainment.¹ Although probably nearly every European in the Congo at that time expected some troubles, very few indeed saw the imminent collapse of the Congo into anarchy, civil war and a year-long state of tension yet unresolved. But in that year the Congo situation became a problem of worldwide importance, and its effects have been felt in Belgium, wracked by strikes until the government fell; in the United Nations whose very structure was threatened and where the African nations demonstrated their growing importance; and in America and Western Europe where diplomacy was challenged by the continuing series of crises.

The Congo situation intensified the cold war and gave African nations their first real opportunity to express and solidify their avowed policy of neutralism. And the Congo itself has not yet recovered from its initial collapse, nor is it likely to do so for some time to come.

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Given the perspective of only a year of the history of an independent Congo, it is not easy to separate out those key events which can give us an understanding of what is yet to come. But broadly speaking, it now seems possible to divide the history of the past year in the Congo into three major phases. The first of these can be called the period of turmoil which began immediately after independence and continued until Patrice Lumumba lost control of the premiership. This occurred early in September, 1960, when Joseph Kasavubu and Patrice Lumumba fired one another; this was followed shortly thereafter by Major General Joseph Mobutu's seizure of power and his subsequent arrest of Lumumba. This period is the best known in the Congo's independent history and needs no further explicit discussion here.²

The United Nations entered the Congo on July 12, 1960, when it received a cable from Kasavubu and Lumumba requesting of the Secretary General the "urgent dispatch" of United Nations military assistance "to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace." The response of the United Nations was the

¹ A YEAR AGO, on June 30, 1960, I was in Elisabethville on my way home from a year's anthropological research in the Kasai Province of the Congo.

² Maurice N. Hennessy, *The Congo: A Brief History and Appraisal*, (New York: Praeger, 1961), 148 pp. Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster*, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), 174 pp. Alan P. Merriam, *Congo: Background of Conflict*, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 368 pp.

passage, on July 14, of a Security Council resolution proposed by Tunisia which

... calls upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo; decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

The United Nations faced a continual series of crises during the first period of the Congo's independence: with Patrice Lumumba who constantly changed his mind about the desirability of the United Nations operation; with Moïse Tshombe when the United Nations decided that it must enter Katanga to make its control effective; with Belgium which withdrew its troops slowly and with obvious reluctance and, time and time again, obstructed the United Nations operation; and with Russian unilateral action. In late August and early September, it had become clear that Russia was pursuing a policy of direct assistance to Lumumba in his "war" against Katanga and Albert Kalonji's Mining State; in response to this crisis, the United Nations closed all the Congo's airports and radio stations, which effectively blocked Russia's actions. This move coincided roughly with the joint Lumumba-Kasavubu firings, with the assumption of control by Mobutu, and with the expulsion from the Congo of the Russian and Czechoslovakian diplomatic representatives. It helped to mark the end of the first phase of the Congo's independent history.

Period of Stalemate

The second phase, which might be called the period of consolidation, began with Lumumba's loss of control and ended with his death, announced by the Katanga government on February 13, 1961. During this period of some five months, a stalemate occurred in the Congo, precipitated primarily by the inaction of the United Nations.

Having achieved some small control of the Congo situation, the United Nations seemed

to be at a loss as to what to do next, and it entered into a period of inactivity during which it made few efforts to reestablish a functioning government. Further, considerable friction arose between the representatives of the United Nations and then-Colonel Mobutu, as the latter attempted to extend his control and the former apparently attempted to frustrate it. Whatever the case, political action was inhibited and the country fell into a period of stalemate so far as the reorganization and effective extension of central power were concerned.

This stalemate had an extremely important effect on the Congo as a whole, for it gave the political leaders outside Leopoldville a chance to consolidate their lines of power. Thus in Katanga, which had seceded officially on July 11, Tshombe was able to organize his army effectively; to bring in outside mercenaries to lead it; to print his own currency; to attempt to negotiate trade agreements with other countries; and in essence to organize an effective regime out of what had formerly been simply a loosely organized state which had declared itself independent. Although the effectiveness of Kalonji's Mining State or South Kasai has never been too clear, it is obvious that in the period of stalemate Kalonji, too, was given a chance to solidify his secession.

At the same time, the Stanleyville regime headed by Antoine Gizenga began to organize itself. During the period near Christmas of 1960, Stanleyville pro-Lumumba forces raided Bukavu, the capital of Kivu, kidnapped its president (whose fate remains unknown today), reduced the effectiveness of local political leaders such as Anicet Kashamura, and effectively took over control of the Kivu Province. Similarly, through the cooperation of Jason Sendwe, Tshombe's chief rival in Katanga, Gizenga's forces, or forces amenable to him, were able to control the northern portion of Katanga and even some of the eastern Kasai.

Thus it was out of the inaction of the United Nations and its preoccupation with its own problems in Leopoldville that the three major lines of power which still exist in the Congo were able to form themselves into more effective blocs. Kasavubu, Mobutu, and Lumumba primarily were engaged among themselves and with the United Na-

tions in the struggle for control of the Leopoldville and Lower Congo area—from which Kasavubu has emerged as the dominant power. Gizenga meanwhile was securing his position in the northeastern part of the Congo. At the same time, Tshombe was strengthening his independent Katanga, and Kalonji, who more or less had thrown his destiny in with that of Tshombe, was at least making his position in South Kasai more secure. Had the United Nations been taking dynamic action to restore the political stability of the area, the blocs might never have solidified; the time gained by Tshombe, Kalonji and Gizenga was priceless for the furthering of their secessionist and power ambitions.

The third phase in the Congo's first year of independence began with the death of Patrice Lumumba and has persisted; it can be called the period of movement toward control and toward the possible resolution of the Congo's difficulties. On February 9, 1961, the Katanga government announced that Lumumba had escaped from jail; on February 10, that it was still searching for him. On February 11, it attempted to implicate United Nations Moroccan troops in his escape, and on February 13, it announced that Lumumba had been killed by "overzealous villagers" in an unnamed Katanga town.

Despite the regrettable nature of Lumumba's death and its implications, the hard fact of the matter is that it removed one obstacle from the difficult road toward reuniting the Congo and stabilizing its government. An assessment of Lumumba's actions is not within our purpose here; suffice it to say that he was a difficult man, whether hero or villain, and that his continued presence on the Congo scene could probably have led only to further bitter argument and strife. His ability to hold the Congo together was minimal, the rationality of his actions debatable, and his position as premier always in doubt because of the extremely fragile coalition in the Chamber of Deputies which had put him into office.

U.N. Intervention

With Lumumba gone, the struggle for power devolved upon Kasavubu, Mobutu,

Gizenga, Tshombe, and Kalonji, and because of the nature of the crisis aroused by his death the African members of the United Nations were led to a round of extraordinary activity. Thus on February 14, 1961, Ceylon and the United Arab Republic, later joined by Liberia, announced they would offer a resolution in the Security Council which called for United Nations troops to set up a buffer zone between the forces controlled by Gizenga and those of the other leaders; demanded the immediate departure of all Belgian military personnel; and called for a commission to investigate Lumumba's death.

This was followed on February 16 by the report of the United Nations Congo Conciliation Commission which had gone to the Congo some two months earlier to try to work out a solution to its problems. The Commission was headed by Jaja Anucha Wachuku of Nigeria, and included representatives of Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Liberia, Malaya, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco. The United Arab Republic, Guinea, and Mali had originally been members but withdrew after Lumumba's imprisonment in the Katanga. The report of the Commission emphasized three groups of points: 1) It supported the new government appointed by Kasavubu and headed by Joseph Ileo as premier, but insisted that the base of this government be broadened to include representatives of the other Congo factions; it recommended the halting of Katanga and other military operations; it asked that the Congo army be taken out of politics; and it recommended that the United Nations be made responsible for the maintenance of law and order. 2) The report recommended that a meeting of all Congo political parties be called at which a new *federal* constitution could be promulgated; it also insisted that all political prisoners be released. 3) Finally, it was recommended that the Parliament of the Congo be reconvened without delay and under United Nations safeguards; and that the United Nations take action to expel Belgian and other foreign military elements from all parts of the Congo.

On February 18, the Commission's report was followed by a proposal from Kwame Nkrumah which included many of the same

points: control of the Congo must involve a military and then a political phase; an all-African United Nations command must be established to take over in the Congo; all Congolese troops must be disarmed; all political prisoners must be freed; Parliament must be convened; all foreign diplomats must be expelled; and the United Nations must abandon its concept of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Congo.

The significance of these various moves on the part of African nations lies in the fact that the severity of the Congo situation, as exemplified by Lumumba's death, had been brought home and that the Africans realized serious action had to be taken. It is also important to note that the various resolutions and pronouncements came at a time when Russia was demanding United Nations withdrawal from the Congo within 30 days and the dismissal of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld. What the African nations were proposing did not follow the Russian line of decreased United Nations participation in Congo affairs, but rather urged increased participation, though sometimes within a changed framework.

This new attitude toward the Congo on the part of the African nations resulted in the resolution of February 21, which gave the United Nations and Hammarskjöld real authority to intervene in the Congo. It urged that the United Nations stop civil war, halt military operations, expel Belgian and other foreign military and political advisers, and carry out an investigation of Lumumba's death. It gave the United Nations authority to keep foreign military and political personnel out of the Congo. It also urged the reconvening of Parliament and the reorganization of the Congo army.

These new moves on the part of the United Nations also had their repercussions in the Congo where they were interpreted as a real threat to the Congo's sovereignty. Thus on March 3, Congo troops attacked and captured Banana, and on March 4 and 5 attacked and captured Matadi, cutting off the United Nations' source of supplies. It was not until June 18 that Matadi was reopened to the United Nations. Anti-United Nations feeling also led later in the month to new outbreaks of violence against Europeans

in the Kivu, and these have recurred sporadically. The capture of Matadi, however, showed a new appreciation, especially on the part of Kasavubu and Mobutu, of the difficulties the Congo would face from the United Nations if drastic actions were not taken to indicate that the Congolese themselves were in control of the situation.

This new awareness led, in part at least, to the convening of the Madagascar conference during the week of March 5-11. At the conference all sides in the conflict were represented except that of Gizenga. He had refused to attend unless European advisers, of whatever nation, were barred from participation. Without him, the conference reached five basic resolutions.

The first of these was that the Republic of the Congo was declared dissolved and replaced with a confederation of ten sovereign states; this was first reported to be eight states, and later the number was increased to twelve. In the second resolution Leopoldville was made the capital of the confederation with a neutral status, something like that of Washington, D.C. The third resolution stipulated that the central agency at Leopoldville would decide on general domestic and foreign policy, but that the separate states would retain all other powers. The fourth resolution agreed on certain measures for restoring order in the Congo, while the fifth called on the United Nations to annul its resolution of February 21 on the grounds that the Congolese themselves were in control of the situation. This last resolution also agreed to collaboration with the United Nations provided that there was no encroachment on the sovereignty of the new confederation.

The problems raised by this agreement were many. In the first place, precisely what was meant by confederation, as opposed to federation or even to a strong central government, was not made clear. It did appear that confederation meant strong, small states, operating almost autonomously. The second problem arose from the fact that the United Nations Afro-Asian bloc reacted strongly to the balkanization of the Congo and refused to support the new confederation. Third, the absence of Gizenga at the conference presented a serious question since

without him it was difficult to see how the confederative plan could successfully be extended to the entire country. And finally, Gizenga himself refused to support the results of the conference, reiterated his stand that the Congo must remain organized under a strong central government, and called for the reconvening of Parliament in a neutral country.

Results of Madagascar

The Madagascar conference was important because it presumably represented the coordinated efforts of the different Congo factions, with the crucial exception of Gizenga, to resolve the Congo's difficulties. It seems clear that the moving spirit of the conference was Tshombe and that the confederative plan was also his. And finally, it seems equally clear that the conference was called in response to the hardening of the United Nations attitude toward the Congo problem. Without Gizenga, the immediate results of the conference could not be important; the hope of it, however, lay in the realization on the part of the majority of leaders that their problems could be reconciled only through joint action.

More recently, the conference at Coquilhatville, from April 24 to May 28, strengthens the view that the Congo's difficulties may be on the way toward resolution. Again the conference did not include Gizenga or representatives of his faction. It was preceded by the very important agreement between the government of Kasavubu and the United Nations in which Kasavubu agreed to cooperate with the United Nations in recruiting foreign technicians and reorganizing the Congo army. Kasavubu also agreed to recognize the February 21 resolution with the understanding that it in turn recognize his prerogatives as president and the sovereignty of the Congo.

On arrival at the Coquilhatville conference Tshombe apparently presented Kasavubu with a three-part ultimatum: 1) that Kasavubu denounce the agreement with the United Nations; 2) that Kasavubu join with Tshombe in a protest to the United Nations over recent actions in North Katanga at Kabalo; 3) that the conference refuse to allow anyone who had not taken part in the

Madagascar conference to be seated at Coquilhatville. The last point stemmed from the seating of Jason Sendwe, Tshombe's political rival in Katanga, who had not been present in Tananarive.

When Kasavubu refused to accede to the ultimatum, Tshombe walked out of the conference and was detained at the airport; his formal arrest, on April 26, was not acknowledged by the central government until May 7 when the Interior Ministry announced an act of internment citing ten counts on which Tshombe would be tried. The major points were that he had "fraudulently assumed the powers of chief of state," that he had declared the independence of a province illegally, that he had "prejudiced the peace and order of the state" by using his power to "commit and lead others to commit murderous crimes," that he had counterfeited and sought "to enhance his position by printing his own currency," that he had created a secessionist army, and that he had dealt directly with foreign powers.

In the meantime, on May 12 the Coquilhatville conference announced some of the provisions of a new draft constitution which called for a tight federation with a strong central government. Under the new system a federal congress and a council of states made up of the heads of the individual states were created. The central government was to have exclusive control of foreign affairs, defense, internal security, currency, federal finance, customs, communications, federal judiciary, and legislation on citizenship. The states would control their own police, soil and mines, local legislation, local services and tribal law. Federal legislation would be made by the congress, subject in certain cases to veto by the council of states.

Finally, on May 13, Kasavubu announced that he would reconvene Parliament sometime in mid-June, and asked that the United Nations guarantee the personal safety of the remaining senators and deputies; since the last meeting of the Parliament, seven senators and nine deputies have been killed, and four others have disappeared. The call to Parliament was originally set for June 25, but the first formal session was not held until July 27. During the first week of August, Cyrille Adoula, formerly the Interior

Minister in Kasavubu's government, and a compromise candidate, was overwhelmingly elected Premier of the new government.

By a combination of events, then, the Congo in the third phase of its first year of independence has moved slowly toward the reestablishment of its own government. The factors leading to this movement have been the reduction of the number of individual leaders jockeying for personal power within the framework of their own areas, the tightening of the United Nations attitude toward the Congo situation, the realization on the part of the Congo leaders of this fact, and finally, the beginning of an understanding that politics is to be played and that men can sit down at a conference, jockey for position, and come up with compromises.

This is not to say, of course, that the Congo's problems are solved, but only to hint that they may be on the way to becoming solved. Perhaps the most serious problem is that posed by Tshombe and his continuing intransigence. On June 22, he was released from political detention, and on June 25 it was reported that he had signed an agreement with the Central Government in which he promised to end Katanga's secession. Three days later, on his return to Elisabethville, he rescinded his accord, announced that he would work to "defend an independent Katanga," and insisted that there be new negotiations among the various Congo leaders before the Parliament met. Since his appointment, Mr. Adoula reportedly has said that his government will act "to crush the secession," but if Tshombe continues to hold out—and he has the economic resources to do so in Katanga—the problem will be extremely difficult.

Although Gizenga was named Vice Premier in the new government, his actions in the past indicate that he will probably continue to pose problems for a united government. His reaction to Kasavubu's initial call for the reconvening of Parliament was to insist that it be held in Kamina under the aegis of United Nations troops neutral or sympathetic to his regime, and his reaction to his election as Vice-Premier was to withhold acceptance. Although his support in Parliament seems strong, there are indications that his power in his own part of the Congo has diminished in recent months.

Kivu leaders have recently called upon the central government to liberate their territory from Gizenga's rule. Gizenga has been reported in such a position as to feel it necessary to carry out a purge of the moderates in Stanleyville. Numerous and persistent reports give the impression that military leaders of Stanleyville are reaching a rapprochement with the central government. Whether or not these reports indicate a weakening of Gizenga's power, it seems clear that he cannot, either politically or economically, continue indefinitely in Stanleyville. Yet his assumption of the mantle of Lumumba and his own apparently difficult personality make it almost a certainty that within the central government or outside it, he will continue to pose problems.

Finally, Kalonji and his South Kasai are probably the least secure. Whether they will rejoin the Congo or attempt to remain independent remains to be seen.

Difficulties of Centralization

The argument as to what form any new Congo government should take is not an easy one to resolve. It has been argued recently that a strong central government is the only hope for the country, but while this may be true in the very long run, a centralized governmental form simply does not seem possible at the moment. The Congo has never existed as a single unit in the minds of the Congolese, and there is nothing to make one think that a change will be forthcoming in the near future. Although the new draft constitution has not been made available in complete form at this time,³ it seems to me that the combination of centralism and federalism it apparently espouses presents a strong possibility for successful application to the Congo as it stands today.

The Congo's road has been difficult, and its problems are by no means solved today, one year after independence. But its removal from the center of the world stage by the crisis in Laos has taken off some of the pressure. The Congolese response has been to move at least part way along the long road back to normalcy. That the Congo will eventually find a solution to its problems, I have no doubt; it is only a matter of time.

³ This article was prepared in June-July, 1961.

Current Documents

THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION ON ANGOLA, JUNE, 1961

On June 9, 1961, the United Nations Security Council adopted by a vote of 9-0 (Britain and France abstained) a resolution telling Portugal to end "repressive measures" in its West African territory, Angola. The resolution also ordered a 5-nation investigating committee covering the situation in Angola "to implement its mandate" and to report to the Security Council and General Assembly as soon as possible. The full text follows:

The Security Council,
Having considered the situation in Angola,
Deeply deploring the large-scale killings
and the severely repressive measures in Angola,

Taking note of the grave concern and
strong reaction to such occurrences throughout the continent of Africa and in other parts of the world,

Convinced that the continuance of the situation in Angola is an actual and potential cause of international friction and is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling General Assembly Resolution 1542 of 15 December, 1960, declaring Angola among others a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter Eleven of the Charter as well as General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960, by which the General Assembly declared without dissent that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace

and cooperation and asked for immediate steps to be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of these territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or color, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom,

1. Reaffirms General Assembly Resolution 1603 and calls upon Portugal to act in accordance with the terms of that resolution;

2. Requests the subcommittee appointed in terms of the aforesaid General Assembly resolution to implement its mandate without delay;

3. Calls upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from repressive measures and further to extend every facility to the subcommittee to enable it to perform its tasks expeditiously;

4. Expresses the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to the problem of Angola in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Requests the subcommittee to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly as soon as possible.

INDEPENDENCE FOR KUWAIT

On June 19, 1961, the British protectorate in Kuwait ended. In an exchange of notes between Great Britain and Kuwait, the 1899 agreement between the two countries was cancelled; and the government of Kuwait became solely responsible "for the conduct of Kuwait's internal and external affairs." The full texts of these notes follow:

Exchange of Notes Regarding Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait.

Kuwait, June 19, 1961

No. 1

*Note from Her Majesty's Political Residence
in the Persian Gulf to His Highness the
Ruler of Kuwait*

Your Highness:

I have the honour to refer to the discussions which have recently taken place between Your Highness and my predecessor on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom about the desirability of adapting the relationship of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait to take account of the fact that Your Highness' Government has the sole responsibility for the conduct of Kuwait's internal and external affairs.

The following conclusions were reached in the course of these discussions:

- (a) The Agreement of the 23rd of January, 1899,¹ shall be terminated as being inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait.
- (b) The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship.
- (c) When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on matters which concern them both.
- (d) Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such assistance.

If the foregoing correctly represents the conclusions reached between Your Highness and Sir George Middleton I have the honour to suggest, on the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the present Note together with Your Highness' reply to that effect shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between the United Kingdom and Kuwait in this matter which shall continue in force until either party gives the other at least three years' notice of their intention to terminate it, and that the Agreement of the 23rd of January, 1899, shall be regarded as terminated on this day's date.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest consideration,
Your Highness' obedient servant,
W. H. Luce
Her Majesty's Political Resident

*Note from His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait
to Her Majesty's Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf*

(Translation)

His Excellency,

Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Greetings,

I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

[As in No. 1]

I confirm that Your Excellency's Note correctly represents the conclusions reached by myself and Sir George Middleton and I agree that Your Excellency's Note and my reply shall be regarded as constituting an Agreement between Kuwait and the United Kingdom in this matter. With best regards.

Abdullah Al Salim Al Sabah
June 19, 1961

ANNEX

*Agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit
January 23, 1899*

*Translation from Arabic Bond
Praise be to God alone (lit. in the name of
God Almighty) ("Bissim Illah Ta'alah
Shanuhu")*

The object of writing this lawful and honourable bond is that it is hereby covenanted and agreed between Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident, on behalf of the British Government on the one part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, Sheikh of Koweit, on the other part, that the said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free will and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Koweit, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease,

¹ See Annex.

Received At Our Desk

INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES.

EDITED BY SELIG S. HARRISON. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. 244 pages, \$5.95.)

One of the most important conferences on Indo-American relations ever convened in the United States was held in Washington on May 4 and 5, 1959, under the sponsorship of the Committee for International Economic Growth. For two days nearly 90 distinguished authorities, mostly Americans and Indians, discussed the nature and significance of the great experiment in national development that is going on in India, and the implications of this experiment for the United States. Over 700 persons attended this conference. Among the American participants were Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Senator John F. Kennedy, Senator Hubert Humphrey, Chester Bowles, Averell Harriman, Phillips Talbot, Eric Johnston, Leon H. Keyserling, George Lodge, Max F. Millikan, Charles Burton Marshall, and many prominent journalists, businessmen, and scholars. Among the Indian participants were Asoka Mehta, a leading Indian Socialist, B. K. Nehru, India's Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, P. Govindan Nair, Economic Minister in the Indian Embassy in Washington, H. V. R. Iengar, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, B. J. Patel, President of the All-India Cooperative Union, P. Chentsal Rao, Secretary of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, several prominent Indian economists, and two of the best-known Indian journalists, Frank Moraes and A. D. Gorwala. Another active participant in the conference was Barbara Ward.

The conference discussed such topics as the roots and current aspects of foreign policy, problems of economic planning and development, with special attention to foreign aid, the food gap, the popula-

tion problem, the community development program, the experience of private American enterprise in India, tradition and change, and prospects for Indian democracy.

To produce a useful book out of a transcript of some 300,000 words was no small feat, but Selig S. Harrison, who was himself a participant in the conference, has accomplished this feat with remarkable success. He has edited and rearranged the discussions at the conference, and has added two supplementary contributions: an introductory essay of his own, entitled "India and the United States: The Long View," and a summary of a panel discussion on the place of the press in our relations with Asia, over which he presided, at the San Francisco Conference on United States-Asian Relations in November, 1957, sponsored by the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO. The end product of the stimulating discussions at these two conferences and of Harrison's skillful editorial work is a well-organized and comprehensive book, which provides a mine of information about India and Indo-American relations along with some revealing insights into the inner workings of the Indian experiment.

NORMAN D. PALMER
University of Pennsylvania

RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN. BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961. 411 pages and index, \$5.75.)

The present Ambassador to Yugoslavia needs no introduction to students of Soviet affairs. George F. Kennan's works represent the best of Western scholarship. They are narratives without peer: erudite, illuminating, significant, and written with distinguished clarity and grace.

Kennan notes that "there has been as

yet no comprehensive work addressed to the entire span of Russia's relations with the outside world, or even with the West, from the foundation of the Soviet regime down to the point where history merges with contemporary affairs." The present volume, originally presented as a series of lectures at Oxford and Harvard, helps fill this gap. The principal developments in Soviet foreign relations are made absorbing reading: the coming to power of the Bolsheviks; the struggle for survival; the dynamics of the Civil War and Allied intervention; the German-Russian rapprochement at Rapallo; Russia's quest for "normalcy"; the rise of Stalin to power, and the outlines of his foreign policy in Europe and Asia; the rise of Hitler and the subsequent Soviet search for security with the West; the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August, 1939; the Nazi invasion; the wartime alliance; and the subsequent postwar problems.

These complex, momentous developments come alive under the author's artistry. Any person interested in the contemporary world, be he student, specialist, or layman, will find a wealth of riches in this volume: wise, humane judgments; critical analyses which discourage but do not depress; and above all a vibrant sense of history. Kennan notes that the picture which he has presented "is that of an international life in which not only is there nothing final in point of time, nothing not vulnerable to the law of change, but also nothing absolute in itself: a life in which there is no friendship without some element of antagonism; no enmity without some rudimentary community of interest; no benevolent intervention which is not also in part an injury; no act of recalcitrance, no seeming evil, from which—as Shakespeare put it—some 'soul of goodness' may not be distilled."

"A world in which these things are true is, of course, not the best of all conceivable worlds; but it IS a tolerable one, and it IS worth living in. I think our foremost aim today should be to keep it physically intact in an age when men have acquired, for the first time, the technical means of destroying it. To do this we shall have, above all, to avoid

petulance and self-indulgence: in our view of history, in our view of ourselves, in our decisions, and in our behavior as a nation."

A. Z. R.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. By HUGH THOMAS. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. 720 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$8.50.)

The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 was one of the tragedies of twentieth century Europe. It devastated Spain and promoted a further impoverishment of an already poor country. Further, it was not only a testing ground for the weapons and strategies of World War II, but a battleground on which competing ideologies and ideas fought for domination. Throughout Europe men's political beliefs were judged, and still are, according to their stand on the Spanish Civil War.

Thomas, a British citizen, is to be congratulated for writing the most comprehensive account available on this critical phase of contemporary history and politics. The book is distinguished by impressive research, excellent organization, and a thorough command of the complex interacting forces which made that conflict such an emotion-laden affair. It is written with style and sophistication.

There are seven sections: first, a presentation of the historical background—the state of Spanish society, the roots of political instability, the role of the Church, and the forces militating toward fragmentation; second, the Franco revolt, and its immediate consequences; third, the reactions in Europe to the Spanish Civil War, and the beginnings of intervention (and non-intervention); fourth, the siege of Madrid, as well as a review of the key campaigns of the struggle; the next two sections deal with the final campaigns and the growing European involvement; and finally, the fall of the republic.

The author blames Hitler and Stalin for the length of the war: "... both found various reasons to justify to themselves the continuance of the war in this way. They could continue to test military (and political) techniques. For each of them, victory in the Civil War might bring as

many difficult questions as defeat. If the Civil War continued, such questions could be postponed."

Thomas blames the defeat of the Republican troops on the West, particularly the British. For "had the Republic been able to purchase arms from, say Britain, the U.S.A. and France then the war would certainly have taken a different course—as different, that is, as if Franco had not been so materially helped by Germany just before the crucial Catalan campaign."

Aside from every definite military and strategic consequences, which were considerable, the Spanish Civil War was, "for the Western world at least, a most passionate war. The very uncertainties of the leading democratic Governments naturally exacerbated the feelings of citizens of those countries who concerned themselves in the conflict. For intensity of emotion, the Second World War seemed less of an event than the Spanish Civil War. The latter appeared a 'just war,' as civil wars do to intellectuals, since they lack the apparent vulgarity of national conflicts."

One final note: Vanessa Jebb should take a bow for an outstanding index, an all too rare phenomenon in the publishing field.

A. Z. R.

THE LONG REVOLUTION. By RAYMOND WILLIAMS. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. 370 pages, book list and index, \$5.00.)

The author observes that we are living in an extended age of revolution: "a genuine revolution, transforming men and institutions; continually extended and deepened by the actions of millions, continually and variously opposed by explicit reaction and by the pressure of habitual forms and ideas." In addition to the democratic revolution and the industrial revolution, there is a third revolution at work—the cultural revolution.

In Part One, Williams examines the "nature of creative activity," which he sees as "the necessary basis for extending the account of the relation between communication and community." He ana-

lyzes the concepts of "the individual" and "society," and the nature of the relationship between them. Part Two develops the character and operation of major cultural institutions, from education to the press, including a few essays on the arts. In Part Three, he assesses "the progress of the long revolution in Britain" and considers the probable pattern of its future development.

In a sophisticated, lucid manner, the author analyzes the interaction of ideas, literary forms, and social history within the framework of British society.

A. Z. R.

THE EDGE OF FREEDOM. By JOHN B. OAKES.. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 129 pages and index, \$3.50.)

John Oakes, a member of *The New York Times'* editorial board, looks at neutralism and its significance for United States policy with a vision that cuts through the distortions of the Cold War. His keen on-the-spot observations and clear mind present a refreshing and thought-provoking analysis of past and future American policy, set against the background of recent developments.

Three-fourths of the book deals with selected new nations in sub-Saharan Africa (North of the Union), the remainder with Russia (7 pages), Poland, and Yugoslavia, as well as with concluding comments. The theme that connects these new African nations with Poland and Yugoslavia is the desire for self-assertion. The major problems of the new African nations are described with sympathetic understanding, and the author recognizes the important point (frequently overlooked) that, while some African nations appear to be following the Russian line, the opposite is closer to the truth. About Russia herself, he says that, while "intellectual contact" was easier with the average Russian in the 1930's than it is today, the Soviet Union has a pioneer society essentially in transition. Regarding Poland and Yugoslavia, there is little chance that their political orientation will shed communism or

socialism, but the two countries are clearly moving closer to the West in matters economic, intellectual, and cultural.

The assumption is that communism will continue its "process of dilution," and that America's interest will best be served by being "non-political." A further assumption is the development of a world free from the tensions of the big power struggle (and thus free from tensions), in which nations will cooperate peacefully for the betterment of mankind.

The formulation of the author's prescriptions for American policy compels reflection and will be criticized for lack of clarity. Our first duty and interest, he states, is "helping [these countries] to gain their freedom now that they have their independence." Our aid should have no strings, "express or implied," and be channeled principally through the United Nations, while that to the "satellites" should take the form of an "enormously greater program of direct American aid. . . ." Sharper definition of these vexing questions would reveal the difficulties of attaining political, or even economic, independence to the extent that it be free from domination, "including our own." Aside from a fleeting lapse in which Oakes terms the nations of the French Community "adolescent children," and from the appealing but not entirely realistic formula that a country's internal vigor is less important to the United States than is its "orientation in foreign policy," he has written a stimulating book which deserves wide reading.

WALTER A. E. SKURNIK
University of Pennsylvania

POLITICAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO.

BY DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 418 pages, bibliographical notes, index, maps, tables, \$8.50.)

This work is not only timely in the view of American foreign policy problems in the area and in the country itself; but also it is a scholarly, sophisticated description and analysis of Moroccan politics from 1955 to 1959. Of the book's 13 chapters, the first four are devoted to historical

background and to "Government and Administration." The remaining chapters, except for the conclusion, examine the various components of the political system in relation to national political problems.

Four "general relationships" are singled out to serve as building blocs for a larger theoretical framework of politics. These four categories (charisma, coercion, institutions, and tradition), in the author's words, are more refined as tools for political analysis than, say, the dichotomy of participation versus non-participation in politics. Ashford provides the student with many an insight that has useful application in the field of comparative government. He suggests that, in a country as heterogeneous as Morocco, post-independence institutional behavior tends to reflect increasingly specialized interests. In bridging this incipient fragmentation, "The importance of the charismatic relationship between the King and the people is undoubtedly the most striking characteristic of Moroccan politics." Ashford's work is rewarding also not only for Middle East specialists but for its contribution to the refinement of analytical tools in political science.

W. S.

THE THIRD SECTION: Police and Society in Russia Under Nicholas I. By SIDNEY MONAS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 354 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.75.)

1825 was the year Czar Nicholas I came to the throne and the Decembrist revolt of young officers was suppressed. The two events meant much for Russia in the nineteenth century. With restiveness spreading throughout Europe, Nicholas sought to ensure the stability of the realm. "In founding the Russian political police, Nicholas attempted to combine a patriarchal benevolence, reminiscent of Kar-amzin, with that administrative rationalism through which European enlightened absolutism had created the modern standing army and police institution in general. To avoid creating a separate ministry, which by developing norms and procedures of its own might acquire a certain

independence as well as the taint of corruption that plagued the Russian bureaucracy, Nicholas did not make the political police a ministry, but rather the Third Section of His Majesty's Private Imperial Chancery."

The author perceptively observes that "far from being the classic home of the police state, as is commonly assumed, Russia was rather behind the times in this regard." With Westernization came the more efficient police state. In 1880, the Third Section "was transferred intact to the Ministry of the Interior and reinforced by a closer connection with the everyday police. And there it remained, in spite of minor changes, until February 1917."

Sidney Monas of Smith College has written a comprehensive, systematic study of this aspect of the Russian autocratic state of the nineteenth century. Erudite and informative, the study traces the developments of the Third Section within the broad context of Russian political and cultural developments. Monas relies heavily upon the impact of the Third Section upon many of the leading figures of the time. The result is absorbing history. He concludes with the following reflection: "In modern totalitarian societies, the political police has become almost government itself, or at least a model for government. It was not so under Nicholas, and on the whole—in spite of the exemplary role he assigned to the gendarmes, in spite of a number of anticipatory impulses—he would not have had it so. There is no historical parallel between the Third Section and the MVD;

only an instructive, indeed a tragic, historical connection."

A. Z. R.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WINTER WAR: An Account of the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939–1940. BY MAX JAKOBSON. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 281 pages, appendix and index, \$5.75.)

"In October 1939 the Soviet government asked Finland to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss 'concrete political matters.'" Thus begins Max Jakobson's absorbing account of the Russo-Finnish war of 1939–1940. Mr. Jakobson is a Finnish foreign service officer, who originally wrote this book in 1955. He has rewritten the English edition and has also incorporated a great deal of new material.

The author makes clear that "in the vast drama of the Second World War, the Soviet-Finnish conflict was merely an incident within an episode: a Soviet attempt to move by force a recalcitrant pawn into the square assigned to it in the deal between Stalin and Hitler." Yet the courageous stand of the Finns against overwhelming odds made an indelible emotional impact upon the Western world.

This is a first rate study, perhaps the best narrative of the Winter War available in the English language. It is recommended for the student, the specialist, and the general reader interested in a moving epic of contemporary courage and determination.

A. Z. R.

(Continued on page 256)

(Continued from page 239)

mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government.

In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honourable bond, Lieutenant-Colonel

Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., Her Britannic Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah, the former on behalf of the British Government and the latter on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors do each, in the presence of witnesses, affix their signature on this, the tenth day of Ramazan 1316, corresponding with the twenty-third day of January, 1899.

M. J. Meade Mubarak-Al-Subah
Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1961, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

(See also *Germany, Federal Republic of, Germany, People's Republic of, U.S.S.R., and United States, Foreign Policy.*)

Aug. 3—In notes to the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany, the Soviet Union says the West must either negotiate a German peace treaty recognizing the division of Germany and terminating Allied rights in West Berlin or face the consequences.

Aug. 4—French, British, West German and U.S. foreign ministers meet in Paris to discuss the Berlin situation.

Aug. 6—The Western foreign ministers reaffirm their willingness to negotiate the Berlin question on a "reasonable basis." Approval is given to a series of military and economic measures to meet possible Soviet pressure.

Aug. 7—The Western foreign ministers' conference ends with agreement not to take the initiative at this time for negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Aug. 13—The East German government closes the border between East and West Berlin to East Germans.

Aug. 15—Britain, France and the U.S. formally protest to the Soviet Union against East Germany's closing of the border between East and West Berlin.

The East German government warns West Germany that another blockade of West Berlin can result from any cancellation of the trade agreement between the two countries.

Aug. 17—The U.S., Britain and France deliver parallel notes to Moscow holding the U.S.S.R. responsible for the closing of the border and calling for "an end to these illegal measures."

Aug. 18—The Soviet commandant in Berlin tells the 3 Western commandants they have no foundation for their protests on Berlin. He claims the East German government has the right to act like any other sovereign state.

In notes to the 3 Western Allies, the

Soviet Union contends they have invalidated the 4-power agreement on Berlin.

Aug. 23—The Soviet Union accuses the U.S., Britain and France of using their air corridors through East Germany to transport spies and saboteurs and thus of violating the 1945 4-power agreement.

Aug. 26—French, British and U.S. Ambassadors to Bonn demand, in notes to the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, that the Russians order the reopening of the border.

In notes delivered to Moscow, Western powers tell the Soviet Union it has no jurisdiction over Allied flights into Berlin and repeat a "solemn warning" against interference with those flights.

Disarmament

Aug. 28—Returning to the Geneva conference after a 2-months' absence, U.S. negotiator Arthur Dean makes new proposals for supervision of nuclear tests. Rejecting the proposals, Soviet delegate Semyon Tsarapkin declares it is useless to talk of a test ban treaty except as part of an agreement on "general and complete disarmament."

Aug. 30—The West at Geneva offers 2 new compromise plans for test ban inspections, which are turned down by the Soviet delegate.

Aug. 31—The Soviet Union announces it will resume testing nuclear weapons and warns that its plans involve a super-bomb 5,000 times as powerful as the one dropped on Hiroshima. Russia also warns that rockets similar to those used to orbit the Soviet astronauts are capable of delivering the new bombs to any point on the globe.

The U.S. terms the Soviet announcement "primarily a form of atomic blackmail, designed to substitute terror for reason."

Inter-American Economic and Social Conference

Aug. 5—As the Inter-American conference opens at Punta del Este, Uruguay, U.S.

President John Kennedy sends a message to the delegates of the 21 nations pledging more than \$1 billion in development assistance during the first year of the Alliance for Progress program.

Loans totaling \$21.6 million are made by the Inter-American Development Bank to Panama, Venezuela and El Salvador for urban development, low-cost housing and loans to small farmers.

Aug. 7—U.S. Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon tells the Punta del Este conference that the U.S. defines the Alliance for Progress as a 10-year \$20-billion program of public and private investment in Latin America by nations of the non-Communist world.

Aug. 17—With Cuba abstaining, 20 nations sign the declaration of Punta del Este, approving the Alliance for Progress. The goal of the 10-year program is to raise per capita income in Latin America 2.5 per cent annually.

United Nations

Aug. 11—Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, presenting the annual budget estimate, forecasts a cash deficit by next June of \$90 million.

Aug. 15—The U.N. Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness opens; 30 countries are represented.

Aug. 18—Indonesia proposes that a U.N. police force be sent to South-West Africa to protect the people there from the racial policies of South Africa. The Uruguayan chairman of the fact-finding committee proposes that the unit recommend that the General Assembly declare an end to South Africa's mandate and make South-West Africa independent.

Aug. 21—A special session of the General Assembly meets to consider France's dispute with Tunisia over the Bizerte naval base. The French delegation boycotts the session.

Aug. 25—The General Assembly adopts, 66 to 0, the African-Asian resolution calling on France to negotiate withdrawal from the Bizerte base. There are 30 abstentions, including the U.S.

Aug. 28—By a vote of 21 to 0, with the U.S. abstaining, the conference on statelessness

approves an instrument designed to reduce the number of stateless people in the world.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 12—An abortive revolt by 80 men is crushed within 6 hours; all the insurgents surrender.

Aug. 18—Cuban Economic Minister Ernesto Guevara pays a surprise visit to Buenos Aires and confers for 2 hours with Argentine President Arturo Frondizi.

Aug. 19—Frondizi affirms the country's alignment with the West and stresses that there is no change in relations with Cuba.

Aug. 28—Foreign Minister Adolfo Mugica, who arranged for the visit of Guevara, resigns.

AUSTRIA

Aug. 1—Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky tells the Italian Ambassador, Enrico Martino, that the Austrian government bears no responsibility for the widespread terror in Alto Adige.

BRAZIL

Aug. 21—The governor of Guanabara State threatens to resign in protest against President Janio Quadros' policy of closer relations with Communist countries.

Aug. 25—Following charges in Congress and the press that his government has been "courting" the Soviet Union, President Quadros resigns.

Aug. 28—The 3 top military leaders say they will not allow Vice President João Goulart, traveling in the Far East, to return home to assume the presidency. They demand the Constitution be amended to allow Congress to elect a new president.

Aug. 30—The Navy Minister announces Goulart supporters have blockaded the harbor of Porto Alegre to stop naval forces from entering.

The 3 military chiefs agree on a formula whereby Goulart can assume the presidency if a prime minister is given actual power.

Aug. 31—The military leaders report that a combined operation has been launched to subdue the pro-Goulart Third Army in the southern state of Rio Grande Do Sul.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Canada

Aug. 1—The new governor of the Bank of Canada, Louis Rasminsky, suggests that the government be given full control over monetary policy.

Aug. 4—The founding convention of the New Democratic Party ends. T. C. Douglas, Saskatchewan's Premier, is named party leader.

Aug. 16—Dr. Mikhail Antonovich Klotchko, a leading Soviet chemist and holder of the Stalin Prize and the Order of Lenin, requests and receives political asylum in Canada.

Cyprus

Aug. 3—For 8 days the British base of Dhekelia has been without a steady supply of water as saboteurs continue to dynamite the pipeline.

Aug. 21—Archbishop Makarios presents to Parliament a Five-Year Plan to cost \$173 million.

Great Britain

Aug. 3—By a vote of 313 to 5, the House of Commons supports Prime Minister Macmillan's proposal to negotiate for membership in the European Common Market.

Aug. 4—The International Monetary Fund reveals Britain will draw \$1.5 billion in 9 currencies, with stand-by authority to draw \$500 million more during the next 12 months to cover international debts and strengthen the pound.

Aug. 10—Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd informs 650,000 civil servants their wages are to be frozen.

Britain submits her formal application for membership in the Common Market.

Aug. 17—The government orders limited reinforcement of its tactical air units in West Germany.

India

Aug. 7—Parliament receives the government's \$24.3-billion program for its new 5-year plan, which began last April 1.

Aug. 15—The leader of the Sikhs, 76-year-old Master Tara Singh, begins a "fast unto death" to support his campaign for a separate state in which the Sikhs would be dominant. Prime Minister Nehru, refusing to accede to the demands, pleads for national unity.

Yogi Surya Deva, a Hindu ascetic, begins a hunger strike against Master Singh's demands.

Aug. 16—The upper house unanimously approves a constitutional amendment to integrate the 2 Portuguese enclaves of Dadra and Nagar Aveli with India.

Swami Rameshwaranand, president of the "Save Hindi in Punjab Society," begins a hunger strike to oppose the Sikhs' demands.

India and the U.S. sign agreements for a \$62.9-million loan for 3 power projects.

Aug. 17—Nehru warns Portugal against any attempt to reach 2 of her former enclaves and says he does not "rule out" the possible use of force to take control of Goa.

Aug. 23—Nehru tells Parliament that East Germany has a legal right to close the border between East and West Berlin and says Western access rights to Berlin are not a right but a concession from the Soviet Union.

Aug. 24—Inkongliba Ao, chairman of the government of the state of Nagaland, dies after being shot by an assassin on August 22. Ao, a close friend of Nehru, was opposed by extremists who wished to make the area an independent country.

Aug. 25—After conferring with U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Galbraith, Nehru makes it known he believes the Western Allies should continue to have access to Berlin.

Aug. 30—Nehru denounces fasting as a political weapon and makes it clear the government will not accede to the wishes of the Sikhs.

Aug. 31—Two Hindu ascetics end their hunger strike after being reassured that the demands of the Sikhs will not be met.

BRITISH EMPIRE, THE

British Guiana

Aug. 21—The People's Progressive Party, headed by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, wins 20 of the 35 seats in the Legislative Council.

Aug. 27—Jagan calls for independence immediately instead of next year, as promised by Britain.

Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland

Aug. 9—In the face of increasing violence, British authorities outlaw the United Na-

tional Independence party in the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia.

Aug. 15—The Malawi Congress party, headed by Dr. Hastings Banda, receives 99 per cent of the votes cast for the lower roll of the Nyasaland Legislative Council and wins all 20 seats. The white and Asian electors, voting for the 8-man upper roll, elect Malawi candidates for 3 of these seats.

About 100 Africans are arrested in the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia after they obey a call from the United National Independence party to tear up their identification cards.

Aug. 18—Northern Rhodesian nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda begins his "master plan" of civil disobedience by burning his identity card and calling a full-scale general strike.

Kenya

Aug. 8—The Kenya Land Freedom Army is banned by the British on charges that it was started by the Mau Mau with the aim of seizing control of Kenya by force.

Aug. 14—The convicted leader of the Mau Mau movement, Jomo Kenyatta, is granted limited freedom after 9 years' imprisonment.

Aug. 21—Kenyatta is given complete freedom.

Tanganyika

Aug. 4—The British government announces that after the territory's independence on December 9 it will be granted £13 million for development projects in the next 3 years.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Aug. 18—Climaxing a 5-day visit by President Kwame Nkrumah, Communist China and Ghana sign a treaty of friendship, a trade and payments agreement and agreements for economic, technical and cultural cooperation.

Refugees from South China report that a cholera epidemic is sweeping the nation with deaths estimated at 30,000.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE

Aug. 1—President Joseph Kasavubu appoints Cyrille Adoula, a Socialist Labor leader, as Premier.

Aug. 2—Both houses of Parliament give Adoula a landslide vote of approval.

Aug. 5—The Stanleyville government, headed by Antoine Gizenga, declares itself "dissolved" in favor of the new central government of Premier Adoula.

Aug. 7—The first 7 members of the Katanga parliamentary delegation to Leopoldville leave Elisabethville, with President Moise Tshombe expected later in the week.

Aug. 14—Hammaraskjold assures Adoula that the U.N. recognizes his government as the only legitimate one in the Congo and will give it all possible assistance.

Aug. 16—Adoula flies to Stanleyville in an effort to persuade Gizenga, who has been offered a vice premiership, to join the Leopoldville government.

Aug. 18—Gizenga makes a public appearance to announce his acceptance of the post of first Vice Premier in the Adoula government.

Aug. 19—Premier Adoula announces that he and Gizenga have agreed on a united Congo and will bring Tshombe's Katanga Province back into the federation by force if necessary.

Aug. 25—U.N. forces fly into Elisabethville to start disarming the 13,000-man army of secessionist Katanga Province. Minister of the Interior Godefroid Munongo declares Katanga will resist any attempt at disarmament.

Aug. 28—Dozens of Belgian, French and British military men commanding the African troops of Katanga are arrested by the U.N. command. Tshombe announces he will release all the foreign officers from their duty.

Aug. 29—Tshombe charges that U.N. troops "arrested and manhandled" him 5 times yesterday while disarming his European officers. He repeats his refusal to go to Leopoldville while the U.N. is applying pressure to Katanga.

Aug. 31—U.N. officials demand the suspension of Katanga's Interior Minister Munongo and an investigation into charges he planned to kill U.N. soldiers.

CUBA

Aug. 2—The Council of Ministers announces a major reorganization of the trade union system on an industrial rather than a craft

basis, with a single confederation at the top.

Aug. 5—All movement to and from the country is barred for 3 days to effect the immediate replacement of old pesos with new currency.

Aug. 9—Cuba formally asks the U.N. to put "newer plans for aggression and acts of intervention" by the U.S. on the agenda of the next General Assembly meeting.

Premier Fidel Castro announces the government will return a maximum of 10,000 pesos each to persons who turned in larger sums during the currency exchange.

Aug. 11—The U.S. tells Cuba it is willing to return a Cuban patrol boat in exchange for a hijacked Electra airliner held in Havana since July 24.

Aug. 16—Cuba announces she is sending a delegation to the conference of neutral nations in Belgrade on September 1.

DAHOMY

Aug. 1—The government seizes the Portuguese enclave of Ajuda and sends Ajuda's chief Portuguese official to Nigeria.

DENMARK

Aug. 3—The Folketing (Parliament) approves, 152 to 11, the government's decision to open negotiations for membership in the Common Market if Britain becomes a member.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

Aug. 2—The Joint Chiefs of Staff announce the disbanding of 3 civilian armed groups organized as an army auxiliary of 5,000 men because they are no longer needed.

Aug. 4—Police battle members of the opposition National Civic Union staging a rally for free elections.

Aug. 6—The police raid the headquarters of 2 opposition parties and arrest 208 persons.

Aug. 7—The headquarters of 2 political opposition groups are reopened and the 208 Dominicans are released.

Aug. 13—Thousands of opponents of the Trujillo regime demonstrate without interference from the government.

Aug. 14—Two opposition leaders who at-

tended the mass rally yesterday are slain under mysterious circumstances.

Aug. 16—Lt. Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr., declares that unless the other American states re-establish diplomatic relations with his country, there will either be revolution from the opposition or revolt by the armed forces.

Aug. 31—The U.S. representative in the O.A.S. urges the special committee on sanctions to send its investigators back to the Dominican Republic for a reappraisal of the situation. Morrison suggests that sanctions may be partially lifted if "definite beneficial changes" are noted.

EL SALVADOR

Aug. 1—The Civilian-Military Directorate announces it is planning an agrarian reform program. Expropriated lands are to be paid for partly or wholly in bonds.

FRANCE

Aug. 17—Following a meeting of the Council of Defense, President Charles de Gaulle decides to reinforce French ground and air forces in West Germany and continental France.

Aug. 23—In the worst night of terrorist activity since the Algerian rebellion began 7 years ago, 25 bombs explode in France, 16 of them in the Paris area.

Aug. 29—Overriding government objections, the National Assembly and Senate vote to convene for a special session in September to consider farmers' complaints.

Premier Michel Debré in a nationwide address extols the success of the government's program for controlled expenditures and appeals for support to strengthen France economically.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Aug. 11—Following increased rebel attacks, the French announce that the army has been given "greater freedom of action" to protect life and property.

Aug. 27—Ben Youssef Benkhedda is named the new premier of the Provisional Government, replacing the more moderate Ferhat Abbas.

Aug. 28—A month-long meeting of the Na-

tional Council of the Algerian Revolution ends in Tripoli. In a closing communiqué, the government appeals to "Socialist countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America" to back the struggle against France.

Aug. 31—Clarifying an earlier communiqué, Nationalist leaders insist support from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union has also been requested in the fight against France.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis, Germany, Democratic Republic of, U.S.S.R., and United States, Foreign Policy.*)

Aug. 9—Following Khrushchev's speech on an East German peace treaty, 1,926 refugees reach West Berlin in a 24-hour period. The August total of East German refugees is 13,332.

Aug. 13—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer tells Germans that the Bonn government "with its Allies will take the necessary measures" to counter the sealing off of West Berlin from East Germany.

Aug. 16—West Berlin's Mayor Willy Brandt writes Kennedy that his city expects "not merely words but political action" against the closing of the border.

Aug. 18—Expressing hope that the Berlin situation can be subject to negotiation, Adenauer tells Parliament the Bonn government will have to increase its military defenses.

Aug. 19—U.S. Vice President Johnson arrives in Berlin and promises its citizens the U.S. will never forget its obligations to them.

Aug. 20—Crossing 110 miles of East German territory, 1,500 U.S. troops arrive in West Berlin.

Aug. 23—The East Germans warn all persons to stay at least 110 yards away from both sides of the intra-city border. In answer, 1,000 Western troops and 10 U.S. tanks are deployed directly on the border line.

Aug. 25—Both major parties declare they favor an early meeting of the foreign ministers of the U.S., Britain and France to prepare the basis for negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 29—Adenauer writes Kennedy that any further reverses for the Allied position

in Berlin may result in a neutralist mood in West Germany.

Aug. 31—West German President Heinrich Lübke makes a surprise visit to Berlin and assures its people the fate of the West is linked to the city's future. The East Germans term the visit a "provocation."

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis, Germany, Federal Republic of, U.S.S.R., and United States, Foreign Policy.*)

Aug. 4—East Germans who work in West Berlin are ordered to pay their rent, utility and public service bills in West German deutsche marks.

Aug. 10—Marshal Ivan S. Konev, former supreme commander of East European forces, is named the new commander of Soviet troops in East Germany.

Aug. 11—The East German legislature unanimously approves any measures which might be taken to halt the flow of refugees into West Berlin. Legislators are told by Foreign Minister Lothar Bloz that the Communist bloc nations will meet in the fall to review preparations for a German peace treaty.

Aug. 13—The government closes the border between East and West Berlin to East Germans, although the movement from West Berlin into the eastern sector of the city is not affected. Two Soviet Army divisions help guard the border. The East Berlin town council rules that East Berliners can no longer hold jobs in West Berlin. These actions follow publication of the communiqué of the Warsaw Pact nations, which met in Moscow early in August. The communiqué appeals to the East German Parliament to halt the mass flights of refugees to the West.

Aug. 15—The government warns West Germany that any cancellation of the trade agreement between the 2 countries will result in a blockade of the overland route to West Berlin.

Aug. 22—The Interior Ministry orders that West Berliners, members of the diplomatic corps, Western occupation forces and all other foreigners can enter East Berlin only at one specified entry point.

Aug. 24—In the face of a worsening agri-

cultural crisis, the Council of Ministers empowers county and township councils to draft all persons in their area to work in the fields.

Special envoys are sent to Yugoslav President Tito to seek support.

Aug. 25—Communist Party Secretary Walter Ulbricht declares East Germany will not seek to control Allied communications with West Berlin until a peace treaty is signed with the Soviet Union.

GUATEMALA

Aug. 15—President Miguel Ydigora Fuentes orders the border between Guatemala and British Honduras closed. The Foreign Office says it is considering suspending all trade with Britain unless serious consideration is given to proposals for a union between Honduras and Guatemala.

INDONESIA

Aug. 14—President Sukarno, deriding the outlawed Boy and Girl Scout movement, urges the new youth league, Pramuka, to encompass the nation's entire young population to further the agricultural and technical goals of the nation.

Aug. 17—Sukarno suggests that the Afro-Asian group of powers, organized at Bandung in 1955, be expanded to include Latin American states.

ISRAEL

Aug. 14—The trial of Adolf Eichmann ends; no verdict is expected before November.

Aug. 15—Voters go to the polls to elect members to the *Knesset* (Parliament). Premier Ben-Gurion's Mapai party retains control by winning 42 of the 120 seats. Ben-Gurion terms the elections a "national disaster" when no one party receives a majority; he continues his plea for abolition of proportional representation and introduction of a system of single-member constituencies.

JAPAN

Aug. 14—Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan arrives in Tokyo to open a Soviet trade fair.

Aug. 16—Mikoyan warns that the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan will subject

the Japanese to Communist military attack in the event of war.

Aug. 22—U.S. and Japanese representatives meet in Tokyo to discuss easing the voluntary curbs on Japanese textile exports to the U.S.

LAOS

Aug. 5—Four days of negotiations in Cambodia are concluded by Prince Souvanna Phouma, neutralist leader, and Premier Boun Oum. They announce they will meet again at Luang Prabang with Prince Souphannouvong, leader of the Communist rebels, to present to King Savang Vathana a government of national unity.

Aug. 14—Representatives of the 3 political factions meet at Namone to work out details of a coalition government. The spokesman for the neutralist forces announces that the Pathet Lao leader has agreed in principle to the accord drafted in Cambodia.

Aug. 16—Neutralists and pro-Communist negotiators refuse to modify their position that only the name of Prince Souvanna Phouma should be presented to the King for approval as Premier. The pro-Western negotiators say the King should be offered at least 2 names.

MOROCCO

Aug. 20—King Hassan II promises to "liberate" territory to the north and to the south that he claims belongs to Morocco. The territory he mentions is held by Spain, Algeria and Mauritania.

NEPAL

Aug. 16—Surya Prasad Upadhyaya, former Home Minister, and Kaiser Jung Raymajhi, former Secretary General of the Communist party, are released from prison.

PORTUGAL

(See also *British Commonwealth, India and Dahomey.*)

Aug. 28—The government announces that in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, constitutional equality with white and Asian citizens will be granted to natives.

Angola

Aug. 6—Portuguese troops reoccupy 2 major areas controlled by rebels.

South Africa, Republic of

Aug. 23—Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd announces that national elections will be held on October 18.

Aug. 24—Johannes Vorster, a former leader of the Nazi party, is named Minister of Justice.

SWEDEN

Aug. 22—Premier Tage Erlander says his government cannot join the Common Market because the aims of that organization cannot be reconciled with Sweden's policy of neutrality.

Aug. 28—Erlander says Sweden is willing to seek negotiations "as soon as possible" with Common Market countries as long as any compromise will not affect Swedish neutrality.

TIBET

Aug. 27—In a letter made public in New Delhi, the Dalai Lama asserts that Tibet is experiencing a food shortage "unprecedented in its history." He also writes that there is "increased evidence" of "forced labor camps."

TUNISIA

(See also *International, U.N.*)

Aug. 4—The Soviet Union grants Tunisia a ruble credit equivalent to \$28.5 million for building dams and establishing a technical institute.

Aug. 5—Foreign Minister Sadok Mokaddem confers in Moscow with Khrushchev and Gromyko. The Russian leaders assure him of their support in the Bizerte dispute with France.

Aug. 11—France announces she is recalling one of 3 regiments of paratroopers sent to defend Bizerte last month.

Aug. 12—Salah Ben Youssef, former Minister of Justice and a political rival of President Habib Bourguiba, is assassinated in Frankfurt, Germany.

Aug. 24—The government reports that more than 1,300 Tunisians were killed last month in the Bizerte fighting.

TURKEY

Aug. 14—The Turkish court trying the 633 members of the ousted Menderes regime announces that verdicts will be handed down beginning September 15.

Aug. 28—The head of the ruling military junta, General Cemal Gursel, is nominated as the presidential candidate of the recently founded New Turkey party. Gursel refuses to say whether he will accept the nomination for the election to be held in October.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis and Disarmament.*)

Aug. 6—Major Gherman Titov, the second Soviet astronaut, completes 17 orbits around the earth in a 5-ton satellite.

Aug. 7—In an address to the Soviet people, Khrushchev reaffirms his intention to end Allied occupation rights in West Berlin by signing a peace treaty with East Germany. He warns Soviet divisions may mass on the West European frontiers as a precautionary defense measure.

Aug. 8—Biologist Trofim Lysenko, opponent of the Mendelian theory of genetics, is elected president of the Soviet Academy of Agricultural Sciences.

Following workers' meetings in major defense plants, Soviet laborers ask the government to extend their work day from 7 to 8 hours to strengthen the defenses of the country.

Aug. 9—At a reception honoring astronaut Titov, Khrushchev warns that Russia can construct a rocket with an explosive warhead equivalent to 100 million tons of TNT and asserts the Soviet Union will use such weapons if the West employs force in Germany.

Aug. 18—The U.S.S.R. publishes purported top-secret documents of the U.S. and its Middle East allies naming targets for nuclear attack in the Middle East in the event of war. Iran denounces the documents as forgeries.

Aug. 24—In a personal message to Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani, Khrushchev says he is willing to negotiate with the West on Berlin and other European problems.

Aug. 29—A halt in the demobilization of military personnel is ordered.

Aug. 31—The Soviet Union announces it will resume testing of nuclear weapons.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

Aug. 16—The government announces creation of one unified cabinet to replace the 3 which formerly governed Egypt, Syria and the whole of the U.A.R.

Syria celebrates the completion of the Rastan Dam, built by Bulgarians and designed to irrigate 62,000 acres.

Aug. 27—Plans are announced to shift the operation of the government to Damascus for 4 months every year, even though Cairo will remain the official capital of the U.A.R.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Aug. 8—President Kennedy signs a farm bill designed to decrease grain surpluses.

Aug. 24—76 per cent of the wheat farmers approve marketing quotas on the 1962 crop.

Economy

Aug. 15—The Federal Reserve Board reports industries set a production record in July, with a 2 per cent increase over June and a production index of 112, compared with 111 in January, 1960. Unemployment, however, remains at almost 7 per cent.

Foreign Policy

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis, and Cuba.*)

Aug. 2—As Secretary Dillon and 35 other U.S. delegates leave for the Inter-American Economic Conference, the U.S. announces grants totaling \$9.5 million to Ecuador, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Colombia for social development programs. (See also *International, Inter-American Economic and Social Conference.*)

In a communiqué issued after 2 days of talks with Premier Chen Cheng of Nationalist China, U.S. President John F. Kennedy reaffirms U.S. opposition to admission of Communist China to the U.N.

Tunisian Defense Minister Ladgham

confers with Kennedy and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk on the Bizerte crisis. (See also *International, U.N., and Tunisia.*)

Aug. 3—Rusk leaves for a Paris conference with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and West Germany on the Berlin situation.

Aug. 11—Kennedy signs into law the measure cutting from \$500 to \$100 the value of duty-free goods tourists are permitted to bring into the U.S.

Washington reports the U.S. has dropped plans to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia.

Aug. 13—Although noting that Communist actions "thus far" do not interfere with access by Western Allies to Berlin, Rusk charges that the closing of the West Berlin border is a double violation of agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the West.

Aug. 17—At the conclusion of the Punta del Este conference, Dillon says the U.S. has no intention of making funds available to Cuba so long as it remains "under the control of" the Soviet Union.

Aug. 18—Vice President Johnson flies to West Berlin to assure the Germans of U.S. support. Kennedy orders a battle group of 1,500 men to reinforce the U.S. garrison of 5,000 men.

The Senate passes a foreign aid bill allowing the President to borrow \$8.8 billion from the Treasury over a 5-year period. The House passes a foreign aid measure which only authorizes an appropriation of \$1.2 billion for one year.

Aug. 21—The U.S. decides to delay signing an airlines agreement with the U.S.S.R. to establish direct air service between New York and Moscow.

Aug. 22—Arthur Dean leaves for Geneva and the nuclear test ban conference from which he was recalled June 20.

Aug. 23—The State Department publishes a booklet to explain to the world the U.S. stand on nuclear test bans. The document warns that Soviet rejection of a treaty will "invite the resumption of nuclear tests."

Aug. 24—The U.S. warns the U.S.S.R. that any Communist interference with Allied access to West Berlin will be "an aggressive act" for which the Soviet Union must bear full responsibility.

Aug. 30—Kennedy announces that General Lucius Clay will return to West Berlin as his personal representative. The presidential news conference is also told that foreign ministers of the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany will meet in Washington on September 14 to coordinate strategy on the Berlin issue.

Aug. 31—Following a meeting of the President and the National Security Council with Congressional leaders, the White House terms as "blackmail" the Soviet decision to resume nuclear testing. The statement says the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons is sufficient for the defense of the country and the free world.

By a vote of 395 to 0, the House adopts a resolution opposing recognition of Communist China and its admission to the U.N.

Government

Aug. 2—The Senate approves \$5.2 billion for federal health, labor and welfare activities.

Completing congressional action on Kennedy's recent request for additional basic weapons, the House approves a \$958.5 million weapons procurement authorization.

Aug. 3—Following today's hijacking of a jet airliner in Texas, the Federal Aviation Agency authorizes airlines to arm their crews on all flights.

The House approves the modified administration proposal for reorganization of the Federal Communications Commission.

The Senate and the House approve a compromise farm bill calling for sharp cutbacks in the planting of wheat, corn and other grains.

Aug. 7—Dr. Robert Soblen is sentenced to life in prison for wartime espionage for the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 8—The House defeats a Kennedy proposal to convert a plutonium-producing reactor at Hanford, Washington, into the world's largest atomic power plant.

Aug. 9—Following a 25-hour filibuster by Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire, the Senate nevertheless confirms the appointment of Lawrence J. O'Connor, a Texas oilman, to the Federal Power Commission.

Aug. 10—The Senate and House pass the \$46.6 billion defense budget, which includes \$207.6 million for a fall-out shelter program.

The Senate votes to make aerial hijacking punishable by death.

Kennedy reports that last January he and Vice President Johnson agreed that Johnson would exercise the rights and duties of the President if the President were incapacitated.

The F.B.I. files piracy charges against the Frenchman who forced an airliner yesterday to fly to Cuba as a protest against U.S. policy in Algeria.

Aug. 14—The administration asks Congress for \$73.2 million for civil defense food and medical stockpiling programs.

Aug. 15—Howard Peterson is appointed as a special assistant to prepare an international trade program to replace the reciprocal trade program.

Aug. 17—The government licenses the manufacture of a Sabin oral vaccine for protection against one of 3 types of poliomyelitis.

3 of the major manufacturers of antibiotics and 3 of their top executives are indicted on criminal anti-trust charges.

Aug. 18—The Senate passes a foreign aid bill giving the President authority to borrow \$8.8 billion from the Treasury over 5 years. The House passes a foreign aid measure which merely authorizes the appropriation for \$1.2 billion for one year.

Aug. 21—The House passes a measure providing the death penalty for airplane hijackers.

The House approves the 7-point anti-rackets program recommended by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Aug. 22—The investigations subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations begins an inquiry into gambling rackets and crime.

Aug. 23—The Senate approves a 4-year, \$655-million program to train 100,000 unemployed workers in new skills.

Aug. 24—Lincoln Gordon is nominated Ambassador to Brazil.

Aug. 25—The Senate approves permanent status for the Peace Corps, with a budget of \$40 million for the first year of operation.

Aug. 26—The Senate passes and sends to the White House a bill classifying airplane hijacking as piracy, a federal offense punishable by death.

Aug. 29—A Senate-House conference committee agrees on a 5-year program of foreign assistance with \$7.2 million in development loans to be financed by annual appropriations rather than by Treasury borrowing.

Aug. 30—By a vote of 242 to 169, the House defeats an administration compromise school construction bill.

The Senate votes to extend the Civil Rights Commission for 2 more years.

Stuart Pittman is appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of the new Office of Civil Defense.

The Interstate Commerce Commission recommends direct subsidies to passenger-carrying railroads.

Aug. 31—Both houses of Congress pass the compromise foreign aid measure.

The Senate passes a bill authorizing \$100 million for a 10-year program of research for converting salt water to fresh.

Labor

Aug. 17—In Cincinnati, 4 locals with 4,000 members vote to disaffiliate from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Aug. 22—General Motors, Chrysler and Ford offer the United Automobile Workers annual wage increases of 7¢ an hour and continuance of the cost-of-living clause in return for a 3-year contract. U.A.W. President Walter Reuther terms the offer "woefully inadequate."

Aug. 26—The U.A.W. and American Motors reach agreement in principle on a profit-sharing plan.

Aug. 30—In answer to a government request, the U.A.W. agrees to extend its contracts with the "Big 3" until September 6.

Kennedy appeals to the steel industry not to raise prices when automatic wage increases go into effect October 1.

Aug. 31—American Motors and the U.A.W. sign a profit-sharing contract.

11 unions representing 600,000 non-operating railroad workers demand a 25¢-an-hour raise by November 1.

Military

Aug. 1—Kennedy signs legislation permitting a call-up of 250,000 Reservists to active duty.

A message of alert is sent to 71 Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. The "advisory" notice urges accelerated training.

Aug. 4—It is reported the Administration plans to limit the increase in the size of the armed forces to 185,000 instead of the 225,000 originally called for.

Aug. 10—The Pentagon announces a 25,000-man draft call for September, the largest since the Korean War.

Aug. 14—The Pentagon announces the Navy plans to keep on active duty 27,000 officers and men scheduled for release this year.

Aug. 15—The Air Force announces a program to keep 28,000 men on active duty past their normal terms.

Aug. 16—The Army alerts 113 National Guard and Reserve units for possible active duty. It also plans to keep 84,000 enlisted men beyond their normal release dates.

Aug. 17—The Navy announces plans to expand its operating fleet by 42 ships.

Kennedy signs 2 bills providing \$46.6 billion for defense, outer space and underground shelters.

Aug. 18—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration decides to omit further suborbital flights and to concentrate on a manned orbit of the earth.

Aug. 24—N.A.S.A. announces that Cape Canaveral will be enlarged 5 times its present size to handle manned flights to the moon and comparable missions.

Aug. 25—The Pentagon orders 76,500 reservists to active duty.

Segregation

Aug. 14—In Jackson, Mississippi, 190 Freedom Riders appear in court to appeal their convictions for breach of the peace.

Aug. 15—The Justice Department urges the I.C.C. to adopt rules for ending segregation in interstate travel.

Aug. 24—An all-white jury upholds the conviction of the first Freedom Rider who

appealed his breach of the peace sentence.

A federal judge in Richmond declares illegal the use of public funds to finance private segregated schools in Prince Edward County while public schools are closed.

Aug. 30—4 high schools in Atlanta, Ga., are integrated on a token basis without incident.

A federal court in New Orleans invalidates Louisiana's school-closing law which allows citizens of school districts to vote to close public schools faced with desegregation orders.

Aug. 31—At the request of the New Orleans Federal District Court, 60 U.S. marshals are ordered to New Orleans on stand-by duty for the opening of schools next week.

VATICAN, THE

Aug. 14—Amleto Giovanni Cardinal Cicognani is named Vatican Secretary of State, succeeding the late Domenico Cardinal Tardini.

VENEZUELA

Aug. 17—President Romulo Betancourt orders a series of measures to stimulate the construction industry. He provides for investment of \$60 million in credits for housing; \$37 million to come from oil companies and the rest from the Export-Import Bank.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Aug. 2—All men between the ages of 25 and 33 are ordered to report for military duty.

Aug. 20—Officials report the army has assumed the initiative in the 7-year-old war with rebel guerrillas. Since May, Vietnamese forces have "started 75 per cent of the fights," and won 4 important victories.

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 25—The Chamber of Agriculture announces that the year's harvest fell short of its goals by 800,000 tons of wheat and 2.5 million tons of corn.

(Continued from page 244)

RUSSIA, AMERICA, AND THE WORLD. By LOUIS FISCHER. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961. 244 pages and index, \$4.50.)

Louis Fischer, long a perceptive observer of Soviet affairs, has written a lively, stimulating series of essays on some of the principal problems of the day. He devotes about half of this book to an analysis of various aspects of Soviet foreign policy. He does not believe that Khrushchev is "ready for 'peace and friendship.'" And in dealing with Khrushchev—"the greatest traveling salesman of the age"—Fischer counsels against trying "to run races with Khrushchev in the gambling-casino-marketplace atmosphere he creates. The tool of the statesman is patient, optimistic, self-confident toil in pursuit of basic solutions."

The analysis of Khrushchev's dilemmas is developed in sharp contrasts, a reflection of the contradictory currents which beset Soviet policy-makers. Khrushchev has in-

troduced reforms at home, but he must be wary of going too far; whereas, "Stalin's ideal was a chaotic Europe and a chaotic China," Khrushchev is confronted with the reality of "a different kind of Europe and a different kind of China." Both create problems for the Kremlin. "Khrushchev accordingly swings, pendulum-like, between coexistence with the West and co-ordination with China, meanwhile taking refuge in incomplete isolation buttressed by national arrogance and motivated by social fears for the dictatorship. Here the outside world has a role to play. A fully democratic West could crack the Chinese wall of Russian totalitarianism. A united, fully democratic Europe could help shape the fate of the Soviet Union." His essay on Sino-Soviet relations merits special attention, for he believes that relations between the two colossi of communism "have taken on the aspects of a real and deep struggle."

The author ranges far and wide; his views are interesting, often provocative. They make for good reading. A.Z.R.

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